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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
STS-37/Atlantis was launched on April 5, 1991 from Kennedy Space Center launch
complex 39B at 9:23 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST). Launch was delayed 4 minutes
45 seconds because of range safety concerns about the low cloud ceiling and the wind
direction in the potential blast area.
Significant modifications were made to Atlantis during its 15-week stay in the
Orbiter Processing Facility. These modifications included installation of 5 new General
Purpose Computers (GPCs) that provide increased capabilities. Each new GPC is 52
pounds lighter and requires approximately 90 watts less power than the older computer
unit it replaces. Carbon brakes were installed on the Atlantis Main Landing Gear for
the STS-37 mission in place of the carbon-lined beryllium brakes. This new carbon
brake system provides extended brake life and an improved performance margin that
lowers the safety risk during landings.
The four STS-37 mission objectives were: (1) deployment of the Gamma Ray
Observatory (GRO), the second of four planned "Great Observatories" being built by
NASA to study the universe across the electromagnetic spectrum (the others are the
Hubble Space Telescope, launched in April, 1990; the Advanced X-ray Astrophysics
Facility, expected to be launched hi 1998; and the Space Infrared Telescope Facility,
scheduled for launch at the end of the decade; (2) evaluation of Extravehicular
Activities (EVAs) for potential application to Space Station operations; (3) conduct of
several middeck payload experiments; and (4) conduct of a variety of Detailed
Supplementary Objectives and Development Test Objectives.
Based on the Limited number and type of inflight anomalies encountered, the
Space Shuttle operated satisfactorily throughout the STS-37 mission. A contingency
EVA was performed by the crew on Flight Day (FD) 3 to free a sticky GRO high-gain
antenna, after which the GRO primary payload was successfully deployed by the
Orbiter's Remote Manipulator System. The GRO, which weighed just over 35,000
pounds, was the heaviest NASA science satellite ever deployed by the Space Shuttle into
low-Earth orbit. The secondary payloads performed nominally.
The scheduled entry/landing on FD 6 was waved off for one day due to high wind
conditions at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB). Atlantis landed on FD 7, April 11, 1991,
on EAFB lakebed runway 33 at 9:55 a.m Eastern Daylight Time (EOT).
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and
Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director prior to each Space
Shuttle flight. The intent of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a
change, or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control
Board (PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety risk
factors impacting the STS-37 flight were also documented prior to the STS-37 Flight
Readiness Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and prior to the STS-37 Launch Minus Two-
Day (L-2) Review (L-2 Edition). This final Postflight Edition evaluates performance
against safety risk factors identified in the previous MSE editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
final report format after each Space Shuttle flight.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director with
the NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to
the Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
\2 Scope
This report addresses STS-37 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and
factors that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the
potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I
for discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
• (NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSB is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 - Provides a summary description of the STS-37 mission,
including launch data, crew size, mission duration, launch and
landing sites, and other mission- and payload-related
information.
Section 3 - Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-37 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-37
flight.
Section 4 - Contains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-37.
Section 5 - Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-35 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight.
Section 6 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-38
mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter Vehicle (OV-104).
Section 7 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-37
mission. Those IFAs that are considered to represent a safety
risk will be addressed in the MSB for the next Space Shuttle
flight.
Section 8 - Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSB, but is available upon request. It contains presentation
data, white papers, and other documentation. These data were
used to support the resolution rationale or retention of open
status for each item discussed in the MSB.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-37 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of the STS-37 Mission
STS-37/Atlantis was launched on April 5, 1991, from Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
launch complex 39B at 9:23 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST). Launch was delayed
4 minutes 45 seconds because of range safety concerns about the low cloud ceiling and
the wind direction in the potential blast area.
Significant modifications were made to Atlantis during its 15-week stay in the
Orbiter Processing Facility (OFF). These modifications included installation of 5 new
General Purpose Computers (GPCs) that provide increased capabilities. Each new GPC
is 52 pounds lighter and requires approximately 90 watts less power than the older
computer unit it replaces. Carbon brakes were also installed on the Atlantis Main
Landing Gear (MLG) for the STS-37 mission; STS-31/OV-103 was the first flight
equipped with these carbon brakes in place of the carbon-lined beryllium brakes used on
all Orbiters since the beginning of the Space Shuttle Program. This new carbon brake
system provides extended brake life and improved performance margin that lowers the
safety risk during landings. In addition to these modifications to the Orbiter, a
Hydrogen Dispersal System (HDS) was installed on Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) #1
for STS-37. This system provides a Nitrogen (N2) purge from the MLP to the 17"
disconnect area to dilute or disperse a potential Hydrogen (H2) leak. However,
excessive H2 leakage was not encountered at the 17" disconnect during STS-37 launch
operations, and the purge system was therefore not used.
The four STS-37 mission objectives were: (1) deployment of the Gamma Ray
Observatory (GRO), the second of four planned "Great Observatories" being built by
NASA to study the universe across the electromagnetic spectrum [the others are the
Hubble Space Telescope (HST), launched in April 1990; the Advanced X-ray
Astrophysics Facility, expected to be launched in 1998; and the Space Infrared Telescope
Facility, scheduled for launch at the end of the decade]; (2) evaluation of Extravehicular
Activities (EVAs) for potential application to Space Station operations; (3) conduct of
several middeck payload experiments; and (4) conduct of a variety of Detailed
Supplementary Objectives (DSOs) and Development Test Objectives (DTOs).
The GRO was deployed on Flight Day (FD) 3. The GRO, which weighed just
over 35,000 pounds, was the heaviest NASA science satellite ever deployed by the Space
Shuttle into low-Earth orbit. Both solar arrays deployed successfully. The antenna latch
sensors indicated that the latches were retracted in preparation for antenna deployment.
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However, the GRO high-gain antenna did not deploy when commanded. A contingency
EVA was performed by the crew; EVA crewmembers were successful in freeing the
high-gain antenna, and it was subsequently deployed. The GRO was then released from
the Orbiter*s Remote Manipulator System (RMS).
On FD 4, activities were devoted almost entirely to planned EVA activities. These
were accomplished successfully, and no significant problems were encountered.
Based on the limited number and type of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) encountered,
the Space Shuttle operated satisfactorily throughout the STS-37 mission. The more
significant anomalies and problems are summarized below.
Postlaunch data analysis of the Backup Flight System (BFS) telemetry indicated
that, from the prelaunch BFS OPS-1 transition until the T-8 second (sec) BFS
reinitialization, the Z-component (altitude) of the BFS state vector was increasing at a
rate of approximately 1 foot per second (ft/sec) to approximately 7700 ft. The BFS
navigation errors were cleared at the T-8 sec point in the launch countdown when the
BFS was reinitialized to the pad B position. Ascent telemetry review indicated that both
the BFS and the Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) performed nominally.
Recent pre-STS-37 tests, conducted in the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
(SAIL) with the new GPCs, demonstrated errors of 4000-4500 ft. Errors were believed
to be caused by gravity feedback; this eventually led to error growth in the
Z-component. The investigation included a code audit of the BFS and PASS, and it was
determined that the problem was only in the first initialization of the navigation function
in the BFS. The PASS navigation function did not have the same problems. Testing of
the BFS at the SAIL repeated the STS-37 prelaunch anomaly on each attempt and
demonstrated that the problem was not from the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
input. It is believed that this anomaly was caused by the increased processing time of
the new GPCs combined with the way the BFS sequences initialization of the navigation
function. Discrepancy Report (DR) 106197 was generated to identify this problem for
resolution.
During ascent, after Main Engine Cutoff (MECO), Water Spray Boiler (WSB) #2
experienced spray bar freeze-up while on controller "A" and failed to cool Auxiliary
Power Unit (APU) #2 lube oil after the end of the pool boiling period. The crew
switched to controller "B", and operation was normal. The crew later switched back to
controller "A" just before APU shutdown, and WSB #2 continued to function normally;
both controllers were then considered functional. WSB #2 on STS-37 was a new boiler,
and both APU #2 and WSB #2 were hot oil flushed. The most probable cause of this
problem was wax buildup in the WSB due to APU hydrazine fuel mixing with the lube
oil. Research of the WSB cooling problem indicated that APU #2, Serial Number
(S/N) 208, had been involved in 6 out of 13 freeze-ups; and on the flights in which APU
S/N 208 and WSB #2 had been paired, the spray bar freeze-up occurred hi 5 out of
5 flights. Further investigation into the cause of this anomaly is continuing.
Reaction Control System (RCS) thruster R1U failed "off1 the first time it was used
[during the STS-37 External Tank (ET) separation maneuver]. R1U was deselected by
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Redundancy Management (RM). The immediate concern with trying to recover a failed
"off1 thruster is the risk of obtaining a large leakage caused by contamination after the
thruster is fired. The flight rule states that a failed thruster should be kept deselected
unless needed for attitude control or to protect against the loss of fail-safe redundancy.
There were 2 other right, upward-firing thrusters available in addition to the failed R1U
unit. The R1U thruster was not fired during the mission. It is believed that the cause
of the failure was iron nitrate contamination within the thruster inlet valves, similar to
that seen on STS-36 thrusters R3D and R4R. The STS-37 R1U thruster was removed
when Atlantis returned to KSC; the unit was sent to the White Sands Test Facility
(WSTF) for further failure analysis.
On-orbit operation of the ET umbilical doors was reported to be nominal for
STS-37. Prior to launch, there was an issue concerning the ET umbilical doors because
of starter cracks were discovered in 3 of 4 door lug clevises (see Section 4, Orbiter 1).
The decision was made not to remove and replace the ET door lug housings on OV-104
prior to flight. Postflight visual inspection of the lug clevises found no apparent crack
growth as a result of ET umbilical door operation on orbit. The OV-104 door lug
housings were removed after the STS-37 flight and replaced with the modified "J-leg" lug
design housings.
The scheduled entry/landing on FD 6 was waved off for 1 day due to high wind
conditions at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB). Atlantis landed on FD 7, April 11, 1991,
on EAFB lakebed runway 33 at 9:55 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). The GRO
primary payload had been successfully deployed and the secondary payloads performed
nominally.
STS-37/OV-104 touched down more than 600 feet (ft) short of the threshold on
EAFB lakebed runway 33. During descent, Atlantis encountered wind shear from
13,000 ft down to 9,000 ft, which resulted in a wider than computed Heading Alignment
Cone (HAC) and lower energy at the transition to the approach and landing interface.
Wind shear was again encountered at approximately 1,000 ft. At preflare, Atlantis was
approximately 1,000 ft below the referenced altitude, resulting in a range error of
3,200 ft. A second wind shear, encountered at an altitude of approximately 1,000 ft,
further reduced the range by 850 ft. The crew used all remaining energy to protect
against a hard landing and high nose gear slapdown loads. Postflight reviews revealed
that information concerning wind shear, gathered by the Shuttle Training Aircraft (STA)
during prelanding evaluation runs, could have been relayed to Atlantis. If the pilot had
known about the wind shear in the HAC area, steps could have been taken to mitigate
wind shear effects. This incident has elevated the awareness of potential wind shear
conditions and the potential effects of wind shear after passing the terminal area energy
management interface.
Postlaunch inspection at KSC revealed no facility anomalies. No flight hardware
was found at the pad or in the area under the flightpath. About 3-4 ft of holddown post
#1 firing cable was found to have remained attached to the Right Hand (RH) Solid
Rocket Booster (SRB) aft skirt.
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22 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: April 5, 1991
• Launch Time: 9:23 a.m. EST
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39B
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Shuttle Landing Facility
• TAL Site: Banjul, The Gambia
• Alternate TAL Site: Ben Guerir, Morocco
• Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Lakebed Runway 33
• Landing Date: April 11, 1991
• Landing Time: 9:55 a.m. EOT
• Mission Duration: 6 Days, 0 Hours, 32 Minutes
• Crew Size: 5
• Inclination: 28.45°
• Altitude: 243 Nautical Miles/Direct Insertion
• Orbiter: OV-104 (8) Atlantis
• ET-37
• SRBs:BI-042
• RSRM Flight Set #14
• MLP#1
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ENGINE
POWERHEAD
MCC*
NOZZLE
CONTROLLER
FASCOS*
HPFTP*
LPFTP*
HPOTP*
LPOTP*
#2019
#2020
#2023
#2024
F4
#23
#6008
#2022R1
#9309R2
#2025R1
#2031
#2028
#2019
#4017
F29
#12
#4010R3
#2120R1
#2027R3
#2120
#2107
#2014
#4002
#4019
F25
#29
#6003R1
#4007
#2521R2
#2216
* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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23 First Flight of Upgraded General Purpose Computers
The next-generation GPCs were flown for the first time on STS-37. The upgrade,
model AP101S, has an overall memory capacity of 256 kilobytes (K) and will perform
1000K operations per second. The AP101S Central Processing Unit and Input/Output
Processor are in 1 box as opposed to 2 separate boxes in the model AP101B. The
AP101S is approximately 52 pounds (Ib) lighter than AP101B and requires
approximately 90 watts less power.
APlOISs were installed in OV-104 in all 6 positions; 5 active and 1 inflight spare.
The installed units were: GPC #1 - S/N 511, GPC #2 - S/N 504,
GPC #3 - S/N 501, GPC #4 - S/N 526, GPC #5 - S/N 508, and Spare - S/N 519.
The 6 OV-103 GPCs have been operated for over 14,000 total hours (hr) (ranging from
1381 hr to 3840 hr). For all APlOISs, there have been over 30,000 hr of operation.
The AP101S design includes error detection and correction for single-bit errors
and detection of 2-bit errors in each word of the GPC memory. Memory scrub is
performed every 1.7 sec. AP101S microcode is improved over AP101B to reduce
exposure to non-universal Input/Output (I/O) errors, a potential Crit 1/1 error
condition. Available memory in the AP101S is 256K, comprising 2 pages of 128K each.
However, the hardware design and current addressing scheme preclude effective use of
the upper 128K of memory. Effort is underway to identify software changes that will
enable efficient use of the upper memory. Current plans target the OI-24 flight software
release, scheduled for availability in February 1992, for incorporation of this capability.
Release OI-20, scheduled to be available in the Fall of 1991, will allow limited use of
the upper memory. Software releases through OI-21 will require less than 128K of
memory to operate effectively. This constraint to the full use of AP101S capabilities was
not an issue for STS-37 because the AP101B is only capable of utilizing 128K of
memory.
There were hazards identified with the use of AP101S GPCs. However, minor
additions and revisions were made to flight rules, crew procedures, and Launch Commit
Criteria (LCC) to account for the use of AP101S. The launch team, crew, and mission
operations team were trained with these changes in place.
Two risk factors in Section 4 of this STS-37 Mission Safety Evaluation address
problems associated with the new GPCs. The first, Orbiter 5, deals with the potential
for the new GPCs to erroneously overwrite memory when commanded from the "sleep"
mode. Procedural workarounds made this risk factor acceptable for STS-37 flight. The
second, Orbiter 8, addresses the failure of a new GPC in the SAIL. This failure was
accepted as an isolated, unexplained anomaly; it was not considered to be a generic
GPC problem issue.
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2.4 Software Upgrade for Orbiter and Space Shuttle Main Engine Controllers
STS-37 was the first flight to use OI-8F software. The OI-8F Orbiter avionics
software release was developed to support the introduction of the new AP101S GPCs.
OI-8F is a combination of the OI-8D software release, first used on STS-41, and OI-9A
that was developed to support the basic hardware changes (i.e., increased memory and
central processor speed) between the AP101B GPCs and the AP101S GPCs; there were
no other application code changes.
This was also the first flight of the AR02 software upgrade for the Space Shuttle
Main Engine (SSME) controller. Modifications include extended monitoring of igniter
"on-time" for verification of igniter quench, changes to KSC load timing to minimize
load errors, and elimination of the Pogo precharge pressure sensor qualification limit
post-shutdown to provide consistency with SSME redline logic.
2.5 Hydrogen Dispersal System Installed on Mobile Launch Platform #1, STS-37
The HDS was installed for the first time on MLP #1 for use with STS-37. This
system provides a nitrogen purge from the MLP to the 17" disconnect area to dilute or
disperse a potential Hydrogen (H2) leak. The HDS includes a standpipe, approximately
18 ft in height above the MLP zero deck, and 2 standpipe support legs welded to the
MLP. There is a 16" outer pipe supporting and protecting a 2" inner pipe through which
Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2) flows. A nozzle is connected to the inner pipe that is designed
for nominal flow of 750 standard cubic feet per minute (scftn) of GN2 at 125 pounds per
square inch gage (psig). The acoustic level at the nozzle outlet was determined by
analysis and test to be approximately 126 decibels. Purge velocity at the 17" disconnect
area was determined to be approximately 35 knots.
The structure above the MLP zero level was hardened for the launch environment.
A blast cover protects the nozzle, and a rain cover (butcher paper) prevents water and
other contamination from entering the purge systems. The standpipe and support
structure was designed to handle a 15-psig acoustical overpressure from any direction
with a Factor of Safety (FOS) of 2,
Analyses were performed of worst-case conditions and potential vehicle drift at
liftoff. For nominal liftoff drift, worst-case drift (3a with a 20-knot wind), and worst-case
engine-out condition (la), analysis indicated that body flap trailing edge and left SRB
aft skirt clearances were sufficient. On-pad engine shutdown excursion clearances were
also determined to be sufficient.
Criteria for the use of the HDS were established by the Space Shuttle Program.
The HDS will only be used to enable a safe (or safer) detanking condition after a
launch scrub has been declared due to high H2 concentration at the 17" disconnect. The
HDS will not be used to enable continuation of launch countdown in the presence of
high H2 concentrations.
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Hazard analysis associated with the use of this system is also in work. The hazard
analysis addresses the potential for debris impact on the vehicle, structural failure of the
system, inadvertent operation, effects of use during fire or explosion at the pad, and
contact with flight hardware during liftoff and abort. The focus of the analysis is on
operation of the HDS as a "detank only" tool.
2.6 Carbon Brakes
STS-31/OV-103 was the first flight equipped with carbon brakes on the main
landing gear. Carbon brakes were installed on OV-104 for the STS-37 mission. These
brakes are replacing the carbon-lined beryllium brakes used on all Orbiters since the
beginning of the Space Shuttle Program. The prime reasons for making this change
were: improved performance margins that lower the safety risk during landings, extended
brake life, and elimination of special handling procedures. STS-31 was selected for
carbon brake system first flight because required instrumentation was available on
OV-103. The carbon brake assembly comprises 5 rotors and 4 stators (increased from 4
and 3, respectively) to increase the friction/braking area. The beryllium brake
assemblies have carbon liners fastened to beryllium rotors; this further reduces the
available rotor friction area. One-piece carbon rotors are used in the improved carbon
brake assembly. Hydraulic pressure regulation is reduced by 500 pounds per square inch
(psi) with the carbon brakes; operating pressure is 2000 psi. Energy absorption
capability of the carbon brakes increases to 82,000,000 foot-pounds (ft-lb) from the
18,000,000 ft-lb capacity of the beryllium brakes. This added capability provides a
nominal brake life of over 20 landings/stops, much improved over the 5 maximum
landings/stops of the beryllium brakes. The additional energy absorption capability
allows an increase in nominal landing speed from 180 knots to 225 knots, lowering the
risk associated with Return-To-Launch-Site (RTLS) contingency landings at KSC. In
addition to increased performance and extended useful life, elimination of the beryllium
brakes decreases the health risk to technicians; beryllium is a highly toxic element.
DTOs involving the carbon brakes, performed on OV-103, will be repeated on OV-104;
some of these DTOs were performed during the STS-37 mission.
2.7 Aft Compartment Hydrogen Concentration Launch Commit Criteria Limits
Lessons learned during the 1990 H2 leak investigation led to a reduction in the
LCC for aft compartment H2 concentration. From the start of tanking through stable
replenish, the aft compartment H2 LCC will remain at 500 parts per million (ppm) for
OV-104. To further protect against the potential for leaks in the high-pressure side of
the Main Propulsion System (MPS) exceeding flammability limits after engine start, the
LCC was reduced from 300 ppm to 150 ppm for the period from stable replenish
through prepressurization of the liquid hydrogen tank at T-117 seconds. This reduction
was due to the fact that only 5% of the high-pressure side is wetted prior to engine start.
A leak in excess of 150 ppm during low-pressure operations hi stable replenish was
calculated to exceed the aft compartment flammability limit when entering high-pressure
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operations. For the balance of the launch countdown, the aft compartment H2
concentration LCC remained the same as that for previous launches.
2.8 Payload Data
The four STS-37 mission objectives were to: deploy the Gamma Ray Observatory
(GRO), evaluate a variety of Extravehicular Activities for potential application to Space
Station operations, conduct several middeck payload experiments, and conduct a variety
of DSOs and DTOs. The GRO is the second of 4 planned "Great Observatories"; the
others are the Hubble Space Telescope, the Advanced Astrophysics Facility, and the
Space Infrared Telescope Facility.
On the fourth day of the STS-37 flight, the Extravehicular Activities
Developmental Flight Experiment (EDFE) required the first space walk by American
astronauts since November 1985. The space walk tested 3 prototype cart designs, the
Shuttle's robot arm as a work platform for astronauts, and instrumented evaluation of
astronauts' ability to work with tools in a weightless environment.
Payload Bay:
• GRO - investigates extraterrestrial gamma-ray sources.
• EDFE - included 3 sets of evaluations:
- Crew and Equipment Transaction Aid (CETA) - a multipurpose crew
system that provides rapid return to the Space Shuttle airlock in case of
an emergency, allows efficient translation, and carries equipment. The
CETA consists of 3 carts and a tether Shuttle.
- Crew Loads Instruments Pallet Experiment (CLIP) - provides EVA
crew loads data.
- EVA Translation Evaluation (ETE) - evaluates EVA translation rates
and techniques while performing representative scenarios of Space
Station operations.
• Ascent Particle Monitor (APM) - collects particulate materials from the
Orbiter during ascent, using an automated mechanical/electrical assembly.
• Space Station Heat Pipe Advanced Radiator Element (SHARE) -
demonstrates and quantifies the microgravity thermal vacuum performance
of a high-capacity, space-constructible, heat pipe radiator element for heat
rejection as a prelude to development of a Space Station heat rejection
system.
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Middeck:
Protein Crystal Growth (PCG ffl) - obtains high-quality protein crystals in
a controlled temperature module.
Radiation Monitoring Equipment (RME ffl) - measures the rate and
dosage of ionizing radiation to the crew at different locations throughout
the Orbiter cabin. The hand-held instrument measures gamma ray,
electron, neutron, and proton radiation and calculates the amount of
exposure.
Shuttle Amateur Radio Equipment (SAREX II) - provides a low-cost
space-to-ground voice and slow-scan television experiment.
Air Force Maui Optical Station (AMOS) - technology development/
geophysical environment study to calibrate AMOS ground-based electro-
optical sensors and study on-orbit plume phenomenology using the Shuttle
as a test object.
Bioserve ITA Materials Dispersion Apparatus (BIMDA) - includes a wide
range of tests focused on the assembly of macromolecules in a thermal
enclosure.
2.9 Gamma Ray Observatory Description
The primary objective of the GRO is to obtain a large body of high-quality data to
greatly enhance knowledge and understanding of the spectra and scale of gamma ray
and associated galactic activity. It is expected that much of the obscuration and
handicaps of telescopic observation on earth can be overcome by conducting
observations from earth orbital altitudes with an observatory capable of full-sky pointing.
The GRO provides a capability for Space Shuttle crew to conduct extravehicular
operations for On-Orbit Refueling (OOR), maintenance and repair, and on-orbit
retrieval. The GRO is comprised of three major elements: the integrated instrument
package, a carrier platform, and flight support equipment. It is deployed by the
RMS.
Instrument Package
Gamma rays constitute a part of the electromagnetic spectrum, similar to radio
waves, visible light, or x-rays. However, the gamma ray portion of the spectrum is much
broader than these other regions. The gamma ray spectrum is over 10,000 times the
range of visible light and over 100 times that of x-rays.
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The astrophysics information of interest is spread over the full range of gamma ray
energies. No single instrument can cover the entire range; thus, GRO carries
4 different instruments, including one that will look for and measure gamma ray bursts.
Oriented Scintillation Spectrometer Experiment (OSSE)
The low-energy range from 0.1-10 million electron volts (MeV) is covered by the
OSSE which consists of 4 separate detectors that can rotate independently to look at
different parts of the sky. The sensitivity of this instrument is over 10 times greater than
that of any unit previously flown. It is able to determine the direction of a source to a
fraction of a degree.
Imaging Compton Telescope (COMPTEL)
This is a midrange instrument that covers the range of energies from 1-30 MeV
and is able to determine angle of arrival to within less than a degree at the higher
energies. It can measure the energy of photons to within 5 percent (also at the higher
energies). Special provisions were made to reduce background radiation effects.
Energetic Gamma Ray Experiment Telescope (EGRET)
For the highest energy range, from 20-30 MeV, the EGRET is capable of
measuring the position of a source to a fraction of a degree and the energy of individual
photons to within 15 percent.
Burst and Transient Source Experiment (BATSE)
The BATSE continuously observes the full sky (except for Earth blockage) for
gamma ray bursts or other short-duration phenomena, and also interacts with other
instruments when a burst is taking place. It makes a full-sky survey of long-lived
(strong) sources. The BATSE modules measure gamma rays in the range from 0.05-6
MeV and incorporates a separate spectroscopy detector with a 0.02-10 MeV range.
Collectively, these 4 GRO instruments weigh nearly 7 tons. The full observatory,
including these instruments, weighs approximately 35,000 Ib. It was designed to be
launched, serviced, and retrieved by the Space Shuttle. It can also be commanded to
perform a power-controlled reentry and splashdown. The GRO provides
communications, data handling, electric power, and attitude functions to all
4 instruments.
From launch until GRO deployment, all 4 instruments are unpowered except for
Orbiter-powered heater operation in the payload bay after the doors are opened. These
heaters are turned off prior to GRO removal from the payload bay by the RMS.
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-37 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-37 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, and 6), that were repeated or
related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-37 flight (see Section 7). The list
indicates the section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSB) Report in which the item
is addressed, the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description
of the item, and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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ITEM COMMENT
Section 4; Resolved STS-37 Safety Risk Factors
ORBITER 12 Clogged Auxiliary Power During the pad confidence run hot-fire
Unit (APU) #3 lube oil of STS-37/OV-104 APU #3, S/N 307,
filter on OV-104. gearbox lube oil pressure peaked at 108
pounds per square inch absolute (psia).
High gearbox pressure is an indication
of wax buildup and the potential for a
clogged filter. Gearbox pressure is
nominally 50 psia during APU
operation. A clogged filter could cause
Water Spray Boiler (WSB) spray bar
freeze-up and an over-temperature
condition of the APU post-Main Engine
Cutoff (MECO). The Operational
Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document (OMRSD)
requires a hot-oil flush if evidence of
filter clogging is present. However, an
APU hot-oil flush has never been
performed in the vertical position; an
OMRSD procedure would have to be
written to accomplish the flush. The
decision was made to drain the lube oil
from APU #3 and replace the lube oil
filter.
STS-37/OV-104 System #3 APU/WSB
post-MECO lube oil temperature ran
cooler than the other 2 systems; lube oil
return temperature was 231 °F
minimum. System #3 saw a second
overcool during entry; lube oil return
temperature was 211 °F minimum.
Contamination of System #3
APU/WSB was suspected.
(IFA No. STS-37-V-12)
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ITEM COMMENT
Section 4: Resolved STS-37 Safety Risk Factors
ORBITER 12 Clogged APU #3 lube oil STS-37/OV-104 WSB #2, which did not
(Continued) filter on OV-104. indicate any problems during prelaunch
tests, failed to cool APU #2 lube oil
during STS-37 ascent. When lube oil
temperature reached 280 °F, the crew
switched from WSB controller "A" to
controller "B"; nominal cooling begins at
250*F. The most probable cause of
this anomaly was freezing of the spray
bar due to wax buildup in WSB #2.
Investigation into APU/WSB
combinations that displayed similar
problems is in work. The same
anomaly occurred during STS-38, the
previous flight of OV-104 (LFA No.
STS-38-01). Both controller "A" and
WSB #2 were removed and replaced on
OV-104 after STS-38.
(IFA No. STS-37-V-02A/B)
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ITEM
Section 5; STS«35 Inflight Anomalies
ORBITER 5 WSB #3A operation was
abnormal during ascent
and entry.
IFA No. STS-35-17
COMMENT
During STS-35 ascent, WSB #3A did
not initiate spray cooling until APU #3
lube oil return temperature reached
277 8F. WSB cooling operation should
begin at 250 *F. During reentry
operations, WSB #3A overcooled the
lube oil. A similar anomaly occurred
with WSB #2A on STS-38/OV-104.
(See Section 6, Orbiter 1 for more
details.)
Similar problems were encountered with
WSB #2 and #3 operation on STS-37.
WSB #2 did not cool APU lube oil
while under operation of controller "A",
and operation had to be switched to
controller "B" when lube oil
temperature reached 280 °F. The most
probable cause of the problem was
again believed to be freezing of the
spray bar due to wax buildup in
WSB #2. WSB #3 overcooling was
encountered post-MECO and again
during entry. Contamination of
System #3 APU/WSB was suspected.
(See Section 7, Orbiter 2 and Orbiter 6
for more details.)
(IFA No. STS-37-V-02A/02B and
IFA No. STS-37-V-12)
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ITEM
Section 5: STS-35 Inflight Anomalies
ORBITER8 Reaction Control System
(RCS) vernier thruster
R5D failed "off1.
IFA No. STS-35-20
COMMENT
During STS-35 orbital maneuvering,
RCS vernier thruster R5D exhibited low
Chamber Pressure (Pc) and was
deselected by Redundancy Management
(RM). Data evaluation indicated that
helium was present in the crossfeed
line. A similar failure was seen on
STS-9. Vernier thruster R5D was
successfully hot-fired on orbit to flush
out the helium. Evaluation of the
hot-fire data indicated some gas
ingestion during the first pulse and none
in the 4 subsequent pulses. RM was
reset following nominal performance
during the hot-fire.
During STS-38/OV-104, low Pc was
experienced on 4 primary thrusters:
R1U, R3D, RF3L, and R4U. Postflight
troubleshooting did not reveal any
thruster leaks or other anomalies which
might lead to low thruster Pc.
Subsequent analysis determined that
these STS-38 thrusters all indicated low
Pc during interconnect operations; the
right pod thruster manifold was
interconnected to the left Orbital
Maneuvering System (OMS) propellant
tanks. When RP03 propellant source
was switched from the right OMS
propellant tanks back to the straight
feed configuration, thruster Pc in R1U,
R3D, RF3L, and R4U returned to
nominal.
This finding led to the decision to
perform thruster firings on
STS-37/OV-104 in the interconnect
configuration. When this was
performed, thrusters LIU and L1L
showed degraded Pa approximately
130 psia instead of 150 psia nominal.
PP in LIU and L1L returned to nominal
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ITEM
Section 5: STS-35 Inflight Anomalies
ORBITER 8
(Continued)
RCS vernier thruster R5D
failed "off.
COMMENT
after reconfiguration to straight feed. It
is believed that there was contamination
in the pxidizer interconnect line.
Troubleshooting will be performed at
KSC. (See Section 7, Orbiter 4 for
more details.)
(IFA No. STS-37-V-08)
RCS primary thruster R1U failed "off1
during the External Tank (ET)
separation maneuver on STS-37. In this
case, the problem was believed to be
caused by iron nitrate contamination of
the oxidizer valve poppet; pressure
traces from the R1U failure were
similar to those seen on STS-36 thruster
failures that were attributed to this type
of contamination. (See Section 7,
Orbiter 1 for more details.)
(IFA No. STS-37-V-01)
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ITEM COMMENT
Section 6: STS-38 Inflight Anomalies
ORBITER 1 WSB #2 did not cool APU STS-38/OV-104 WSB #2 controller "A"
lube oil while under failed to cool APU lube oil after the
operation of controller "A", end of the pool boiling period during
ascent. The crew switched to controller
IFA No. STS-38-01 "B" when the temperature reached
275 °F, and APU #2 was left "on" after
APUs #1 and #3 were shut down.
After switching to controller "B", lube
oil temperature peaked at 300 °F before
cooling was observed after 66 seconds
(sec). Controller "A" was selected for
reentry to determine if the temperature
control operated properly; controller
"A" operated normally. It was believed
that spray bar freeze-up on controller
"A" during ascent caused the problem.
Freezing of the spray bar could have
been caused by low heat load on
APU #2, or controller "A" was not
functioning properly. A similar cooling
problem was experienced on STS-1
through STS-4 and on STS-35/OV-102.
(IFA No. STS-35-V-17)
Similar problems were encountered with
WSB #2 operation on STS-37. WSB
#2 did not cool APU lube oil while
under operation of controller "A", and
operation had to be switched to
controller "B" when lube oil
temperature reached 280 °F. The most
probable cause of the problem was
again believed to be freezing of the
spray bar due to wax buildup in the
WSB #2. (See Section 7, Orbiter 2 for
more details.)
(IFA No. STS-37-V-02A/B)
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SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-37 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a summary of the safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-37. These items were reviewed by the NASA safety community. A
description of the risk factor, information regarding problem resolution, and rationale
for flight are provided for each safety risk factor. The safety position with respect to
resolution is based on findings resulting from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP),
Prelaunch Assessment Review (PAR), and Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) evaluations (or other special panel findings). It represents the safety assessment
arrived at in accordance with actions taken, efforts conducted, and tests/retests and
inspections performed to resolve each specific problem.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the risk factor title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
risk factor, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
The following risk factors, contained in this section, represent an increase in risk
above the Level I approved Hazard Baseline.
Integration 1 New Criticality 1 and 1/R2 failure modes have been identified for
the Rate Gyro Assemblies on the Orbiter and Solid Rocket
Boosters.
Orbiter 1 External Tank umbilical door lug clevis cracks on STS-37/OV-104.
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SECTION 4 INDEX
RESOLVED STS-37 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/ RISK
SEQ. NO. FACTOR PAGE
INTEGRATION
1 New Criticality 1 and 1/R2 failure modes have been identified for the 4-4
Rate Gyro Assemblies on the Orbiter and Solid Rocket Boosters.
ORBITER
1 External Tank umbilical door lug clevis cracks on STS-37/OV-104. 4-7
2 STS-39/OV-103 pilot-side Display Driver Unit Attitude Direction 4-12
Indicator ball hesitation.
3 STS-37/OV-104 Auxiliary Power Unit #3, Serial Number 307, 4-13
uncommanded Gas Generator Valve Module Shutoff Valve motion.
4 New Data Processing System failure could lead to a Criticality 1/1 4-14
condition.
5 Potential for new General Purpose Computers to erroneously 4-16
overwrite memory.
6 Cabin pressure bleed valve anomalies on OV-105. 4-19
7 OV-104 wing strut tubes found damaged during STS-38 postflight 4-20
inspection.
8 New General Purpose Computer, AP-101S, failure mode. 4-21
9 Indications of voids and debris found in review of STS-37/OV-104 4-22
Nose Landing Gear holograms.
10 A Main Propulsion System 3-way helium solenoid valve failed leak 4-24
tests on OV-102.
11 Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve weld crack found on OV-103. 4-27
12 Clogged Auxiliary Power Unit #3 lube oil filter on OV-104. 4-29
13 Debris found in STS-37/OV-104 window #1. 4-31
1 High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump first-stage turbine disc cracking. 4-32
2 Suspected contamination of engine #2029 High-Pressure Oxidizer 4-34
Turbopump.
3 Pogo standpipe thermal insulator may have been inadvertently 4-35
removed during final engine assembly.
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SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-37 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/ RISK
SEQ. NO. FACTOR PAGE
SSME
4 Potential for pad abort caused by purge check valve seat leakage. 4-35
5 Potential for loss of Space Shuttle Main Engine controller 4-37
redundancy.
6 High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump second-stage turbine blades found 4-38
rubbing coolant jet tubes on Unit Number 6009.
7 Engine #0213, G-15 seal failed during ground testing at Stennis Space 4-39
Center.
SRB
SRM
Solid Rocket Booster Auxiliary Power Unit speed trace anomaly 4-40
during Acceptance Checkout.
Thrust Vector Control hydraulic reservoir found with 1/4" nut wedged 4-42
between piston and cylinder head.
1 Test and Evaluation Motor-7 fixed housing ablative liner debond. 4-44
2 Inner Boot Ring bond line separation on STS-38 right-hand Solid 4-44
Rocket Motor.
3 Room Temperature Vulcanizing was found past the primary O-ring of 4-46
nozzle joint #5 on disassembly of Test and Evaluation Motor-7.
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RESOLVED STS-37 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
COMMENTS/RISK ACCEPTANCE
RATIONALE
INTEGRATION
1 New Criticality (Crit) 1 and 1/R2 failure
modes have been identified for the Rate
Gyro Assemblies (RGAs) on the Orbiter
and Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs).
HRNo. INTG-144C{C}
INTG-165A {C}
B-50-18 Rev. C-DCN2 {C}
No RGA problems were reported on
STS-37.
Review of recent RGA test data indicated occurrence of a large output transient, up
to 45% of full scale, that lasts approximately 10 seconds (sec) when power to an
RGA is lost. It was previously believed that the RGA output would immediately go
to zero when power was removed. In operation, Redundancy Management (RM)
software normally selects the second highest output value from 1 of 4 SRB RGAs
for further processing. Post-SRB separation during ascent, and during descent, RM
will select the second highest output value from 1 of 4 Orbiter RGAs. However,
because it is now known that RGA output can stay high for as long as 10 sec after
power is removed, the potential exists for RM to select erroneous output data from
an RGA that has lost power as the second highest value. Selection of erroneous
data could lead to loss of vehicle control and subsequent loss of the crew and
vehicle.
Reevaluation of the RGA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for Orbiter
and SRB RGA power circuits and the effects of simultaneous loss of power to 2
RGAs identified Crit 1/R2 failure modes for both the Orbiter and SRB RGAs.
The first failure could be a latent, redundant power feed circuit component (i.e., a
remote power controller, a diode failing open, etc.). The second potential failure
could be loss of a second string redundant path and power feed to another RGA
with a non-redundant power source. These 2 failures would result in simultaneous
loss of power to 2 RGAs. A Crit 1/1 failure mode was found to be associated with
the SRB RGAs. No Crit 1/1 failure modes were identified for the Orbiter RGAs.
In the case of the SRB RGAs, demate of a single connector (55W1P113/J3) on the
Orbiter Master Event Controller (MEC) #2 or in the Orbiter Avionics Bay #5
feedthrough (50W92P299/J99) will result in simultaneous loss of power to 2 SRB
RGAs. Additionally, opening of all 3 poles of the 3-pole MEC #2 power toggle
switch will also cause simultaneous loss of power to 2 SRB RGAs. Power
distribution to the RGAs within the SRBs is redundant.
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RESOLVED STS-37 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
COMMENTS/RISK ACCEPTANCE
RATIONALE
INTEGRATION
1 (Continued) New Crit 1 and 1/R2 failure modes have
been identified for the RGAs on the
Orbiter and SRBs.
Two Critical Item List (CIL) waivers, CR S50260D and CR S50260S, were
submitted to address the new Crit 1/1 and 1/R2 conditions identified and were
approved for STS-37/OV-104 and STS-39/OV-103. CR S50260D addresses
component and power bus failures in the Orbiter that create the Crit 1/R2
condition for Orbiter and SRB RGAs. CR S50260S addresses the 2 Orbiter
connector demates/failures that create the Crit 1/1 condition for SRB RGAs. An
existing Crit 1/1 CIL for the 3-pole MEC #2 power toggle switch is unchanged by
these findings.
Flight Rule (FR) 8-47 was prepared to reduce the risk of simultaneous RGA power
loss and output of erroneous data. This FR directs the crew to deselect 1 Orbiter
RGA when the first failure is detected. Ground test procedures were incorporated
to verify the integrity of the SRB RGA backup power logic source during essential
power bus tests at T-l hour. Photographic documentation of the Crit 1/1
connectors was also mandated to ensure proper connector seating. Review of the
applicable photographs and video tape determined that these connectors were
properly installed. Review of recent processing records determined that the critical
connectors, 55W1P113/J3 and 50W92P299/J99, had not been demated since the
STS-27 flow. Additionally, a switch guard was installed over the MEC #2 power
toggle switch to preclude inadvertent action by the crew. An effort is underway to
obtain a design solution to eliminate these failure modes from the system.
To date, there have been no failures in the Orbiter and SRB RGA power circuits.
There is also a low failure rate for critical power circuit components (i.e., remote
power controllers and diodes).
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RESOLVED STS-37 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
COMMENTS/RISK ACCEPTANCE
RATIONALE
INTEGRATION
1 (Continued) New Crit 1 and 1/R2 failure modes have
been identified for the RGAs on the
Orbiter and SRBs.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• Redundant power circuits were tested during normal flow processing.
Additional prelaunch tests were identified to verify the SRB RGA backup
power logic source.
• Reliability of RGA power circuit components is high.
• Photographic documentation of critical connectors demonstrated proper
connector installation.
• Critical connectors were not demated since STS-27.
• A switch guard was installed over the MEC #2 power toggle switch to
preclude inadvertent actuation.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
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RESOLVED STS-37 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
COMMENTS/RISK ACCEPTANCE
RATIONALE
ORBITER
1 External Tank (ET) umbilical door lug
clevis cracks on STS-37/OV-104.
HR No. ORBI-302A {AR}
No problems were experienced with
umbilical door closure on STS-37.
Postflight visual inspection of
STS-37/OV-104 ET door lug crevises
found no apparent crack growth as a result
ofET umbilical door closure operations on
orbit. All OV-104 ET door tog housing!
have now been replaced with the modified
J-leg big design.
ET umbilical door lug clevis cracks and displacement observed on OV-103 have led
to increased inspection and awareness on other Orbiters. Dye-penetrant and etch
inspection of OV-104 revealed crack initiation on 3 of 4 lug clevises; the fourth
clevis showed indications of pitting. Eddy current measurements of the cracks
indicated a maximum depth of 0.025" ±0.005". No lug displacement was noted, and
adjustments made to the door rigging during the STS-37 flow were considered
unaffected by the presence of clevis cracks with the current flaw size. Discovery of
these cracks on OV-104 was made after the ET umbilical doors were locked open
on the centerline latches. Previous inspection of OV-104 lug clevises, with the ET
umbilical doors at the 90° position, found indications of pitting only.
Analysis conducted during the STS-39/OV-103 investigation determined that Low-
Cycle Fatigue (LCF) coupled with a stress riser (radius) at the lug clevis could lead
to initiation of small cracks in the clevis. Rockwell International (RI) and the
Orbiter Project reverified this analysis following the discovery of cracks on OV-104
and confirmed by stress analysis that the peak stress of 42.3 thousand pounds per
square inch (ksi) occurs at the base of the lug during normal ground-processing
door cycling when the doors are latched at the centerline. This peak stress level is
in the LCF range for 7075-T73 aluminum, the lug material. An independent
assessment conducted by Code QT/Vitro confirmed this conclusion and further
indicated that as few as 250 ground-processing door cycles, and application of
associated tensile and compressive loads on the lug clevis, were sufficient to cause
crack initiation.
Rl/Orbiter Project stress analysis of the starter cracks observed on OV-104
indicated a resulting positive safety margin of 34% above the 1.4 structural Factor
of Safety (FOS). This determination was made considering the presence of a clevis
crack, 0.025" in depth, with 48.5-ksi peak stress applied to the clevis. A fracture
analysis, also performed by Rl/Orbiter Project, indicated that the crack is stable in
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RESOLVED STS-37 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
COMMENTS/RISK ACCEPTANCE
RATIONALE
ORBITER
1 (Continued) ET umbilical door lug clevis cracks on
STS-37/OV-104.
the current configuration. Predictions made using the fracture analysis model
demonstrated that a 0.025"-deep clevis crack would be stable (defined as slow,
subcritical crack growth) for more than 300 ground-processing load cycles (a load
cycle is defined as door swing from the open, latched position to the ready-to-latch,
sag position). For the remainder of the STS-37 prelaunch activities and mission, the
ET umbilical doors cycled once on orbit and were returned to the open, latched
position for the ferry flight.
Because repeated inspections using dye-penetrant and etching techniques were
performed on OV-104 lugs, concern was raised relative to the potential for etchant
entrapment in the crack leading to accelerated crack growth. Pasa-Jell 105, an acid
etchant normally used for aluminum surface treatment for adhesive bonding, was
used on the OV-104 lug clevises. Pasa-Jell 105 is comprised of sulfuric acid and
sodium dichromate, and uses thixotropic as a thickening agent. This etchant has a
gelatinous consistency and is viscous in nature. It is, therefore, not believed that the
Pasa-Jell 105 could penetrate tight cracks such as those observed on OV-104 lugs.
The subsequent applications of dye-penetrant fluid and saline solution, used to
remove excess dye penetrant after inspection, are believed sufficient to flush out
Pasa-Jell 105 residue if present.
Sulfuric acid contribution to stress corrosion in 7075-T73 aluminum was evaluated.
Sulfuric acid is often used to anodize aluminum and to prepare aluminum for
bonding. There is no known history of aluminum stress corrosion from sulfuric acid
exposure. The Orbiter Project, however, performedests on a 7075-T73 aluminum
specimen with an induced crack and etched with Pasa-Jell 105 to verify the absence
of stress corrosion. Preliminary results of these tests, provided on March 14, 1991,
indicated no crack growth with cyclic application of compression and tension loads.
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RESOLVED STS-37 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
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ORBITER
1 (Continued) ET umbilical door lug clevis cracks on
STS-37/OV-104.
Code QT/Vitro performed an independent analysis of a 7075-T73 aluminum lug
with a starter crack, similar to that observed on OV-104, to determine the rate of
crack growth. The load applied to the lug for this analysis was 2300 pounds (Ib),
the load determined by the Orbiter Project that results from the maximum push-up
load (210 Ib) on the ET umbilical door to achieve centerline latch. The 210-lb
push-up load was identified as the greatest force applied to the ET door, during all
ground-processing and operational scenarios, that transfers the greatest tensile
stress (2300 Ib) to the lug clevises. Results of this analysis indicated that the
existing cracks would not grow to critical size. Crack growth, under a worst-case
load without further door cycling, was projected to grow at a rate of 3.5 x 105
inches per hour, or 0.035" over a period of six weeks.
Consideration was given to the total OV-104 analysis effort by the Space Shuttle
Program Management on March 6, 1991. The consensus of the community and
Program Management was favorable, with the following exceptions:
• The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Safety Director recommended that the
cracked lugs on OV-104 be replaced with new lugs from OV-105 prior to
STS-37 flight. This action would leave no concern regarding the
acceptability for STS-37 flight.
• The Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission Quality,
accepted the findings of the analysis but recommended that a visual
inspection (borescope) be performed prior to launch to verify that the
clevis cracks had not grow.
After consideration of these exceptions, the Space Shuttle Program Director made
the decision to accept the residual risks associated with launching STS-37/OV-104
with starter cracks in the lug clevises and to clear STS-37/OV-104 for flight. The
Director decided that further visual inspection would not be required prior to flight.
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ORBITER
1 (Continued) ET umbilical door lug clevis cracks on
STS-37/OV-104.
The Space Shuttle SSRP and NASA Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS, also
considered the results of the evaluation and the relative safety for STS-37 flight.
The conclusions reached by the SSRP and Code QS are as follows:
• There was an increased risk associated with launching STS-37/OV-104 with
starter cracks on the ET umbilical door lug clevises.
• OV-104 lug clevises should be visually inspected at the pad prior to launch
to verify that the existing cracks had not grow or open, and displacement of
the lug(s) similar to that seen on OV-103 did not exist.
• Visual verification of the lug clevis cracks would increase confidence that
analysis performed to date was accurate and that OV-104 was safe for
flight.
After careful consideration of these conclusions and the independent analysis
performed by the Orbiter Project and Code QT, the Associate Administrator for
the Office of Safety and Mission Quality accepted the residual risks associated with
launching STS-37/OV-104 with starter cracks and determined that a visual
inspection of the lug clevises was not necessary to clear STS-37/OV-104 for flight.
It was reported that, during receiving inspection of OV-105 lugs scheduled for
installation on OV-103, 1 of the 4 lugs was found with indications of a starter crack.
This crack was found through dye-penetrant and eddy-current testing. Indications
were that the crack initiated through the same LCF phenomenon seen on the other
Orbiters. This was attributed to the number of door cycles required to install and
properly rig the OV-105 ET doors. Because of this finding, the decision was made
to install the modified OV-102 lugs on OV-103 and to return the OV-105 lugs to RI
for rework and modification.
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ORBITER
1 (Continued) ET umbilical door lug clevis cracks on
STS-37/OV-104.
While inspecting the OV-103 ET door assembly at RI, it was discovered that the
splined shaft index mark was not correctly marked on the RH aft housing, resulting
in the pushrod adjustment being adjusted to its full available travel. Inspection of
the other 3 OV-103 ET door assemblies was performed. In addition, 2 of the
OV-105 assemblies being readied for shipment to KSC were found with the splined
shaft index marked 180" from the drawing requirement. The OV-105 shafts will be
disassembled and fixed prior to shipment to KSC. OV-102 splined shafts were
inspected and found to be correctly marked. These findings called into question the
condition of the splined shafts and associated index markings on STS-37/OV-104.
The OV-104 assemblies could not be examined in the current, staked position.
However, RI verified that pushrod measurements were made and determined that
critical shaft alignments were well within drawing tolerances. Additionally, rigging
of both OV-104 ET doors was functionally verified by Operational Maintenance
Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD) checkout procedures during
the STS-37 flow.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The Space Shuttle Program Director and the Associate Administrator of
the Office of Safety and Mission Quality accepted the residual risk
associated with launching STS-37/OV-104 with starter cracks in the ET
door lug clevises and decided that further inspection was not required prior
to launch.
• Results of the Orbiter Project specimen testing indicated that there was no
crack growth in the presence of the Pasa-Jell etchant.
• Verification of proper spline shaft alignment was accomplished.
This risk factor was accepted for STS-37.
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2 STS-39/OV-103 pilot-side Display Driver
Unit (DDU) Attitude Direction Indicator
(ADI) ball hesitation.
No DDU ADI problems were reported that
affected performance on STS-37.
During Operational Sequence (OPS)-9 dedicated display dynamic drive testing on
STS-39/OV-103, the pilot-side DDU ADI ball occasionally hesitated. Similar
testing on the commander-side DDU found the ADI ball to work properly. The
commander-side ADI was relocated into the pilot-side position, where it also was
found to hesitate. The commander's ADI was returned to the commander-side
position and was found to operate correctly. The identical OPS-9 testing was
performed on OV-104 with the same results; ADI ball hesitation occurred on the
pilot side only. Subsequent testing at the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
(SAIL) determined that this anomalous condition was demonstrated in the pilot and
aft ADIs. Testing with both the new General Purpose Computers (GPCs) and new
flight software, and the old GPCs and STS-35 flight software, gave the same results.
This problem was traced to the DDU and the way it processes ADI data. It was
determined that the DDU does not process the ADI ball data for one update cycle
on an intermittent basis. This phenomenon occurs both in the OPS-9 dynamic drive
tests on the ground and when using the OPS-0, -1, -2, -3, and -6 flight software.
Troubleshooting and SAIL testing are continuing to further isolate the cause of this
problem. Testing is also planned for OV-105.
The STS-37 crew was informed of the problem, and this condition was
demonstrated to them. The crew determined that this condition was acceptable for
flight and would not adversely impede their performance.
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2 (Continued) STS-39/OV-103 pilot-side DDU ADI ball
hesitation.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The ADI ball hesitation was demonstrated to the STS-37 crew and was
determined not to impede performance.
• There were no other known DDU processing anomalies in the new GPC
OPS software.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
STS-37/OV-104 Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) #3, Serial Number (S/N) 307,
uncommanded Gas Generator Valve
Module (GGVM) Shutoff Valve (SOV)
motion.
HR No. ORBI-031 {AR}
ORBI-184 {AR}
No APU GGVM problems were reported
on STS-37.
APU #3, S/N 307, was installed on STS-37/OV-104 since the last flight. During
APU fuel line high-point bleed operations, the injector temperature indicated an
unexpected increase of 60°F over a 24-minute (min) period. Review of the gas
generator bed temperature data confirmed the temperature rise. Injector and gas
generator bed temperature rise is a positive indication that fuel is reaching the bed.
Troubleshooting isolated the cause to fuel leakage through the SOV. Movement of
the SOV was confirmed by a fuel pump inlet pressure decrease and an exhaust duct
pressure increase during the same 24-min period. A subsequent GGVM liquid leak
check of the SOV valve was performed at 370 pounds per square inch absolute
(psia), with no indicated leakage. This further confirmed that the SOV had moved
slightly to the open position and had not leaked. Additional leak checks were
performed at pressures between 20 and 100 psia to confirm low-pressure sealing.
APU #3, S/N 307, was hot-fired at the pad prior to launch. Additionally, a final
GGVM liquid leak check was performed at the pad to verify SOV integrity prior to
launch.
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3 (Continued) STS-37/OV-104 APU #3, S/N 307,
uncommanded GGVM SOV motion.
The cause of the SOV valve opening is still unidentified. KSC documented this
problem as an unexplained anomaly to be resolved prior to STS-39 flight.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• APU #3, S/N 307, was hot-fired at the pad to verify APU performance
integrity.
• OMRSD liquid leak checks were performed at the pad; this verified
GGVM valve integrity prior to launch.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
New Data Processing System (DPS)
failure could lead to a Crit 1/1 condition.
No similar anomalies were reported on
STS-37.
During testing in the SAIL on January 12, 1991, an operator noticed that the left
keyboard entry was displayed simultaneously on Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) #1 and
CRT #3. Because the select switch was in the CRT #3 position, the keyboard
entry should have been displayed only on CRT #3. The operator cycled the select
switch several times, and the problem was corrected.
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4 (Continued) New DPS failure could lead to a Crit 1/1
condition.
Troubleshooting determined that the anomaly could not be isolated to a hardware
problem because it repeated with different SAIL hardware. Potential hardware
failure modes that could cause the same effects were identified:
• CRT select switch, Part Number (P/N) ME452-0102-7201, contact short-to-
ground or contact-to-contact short.
• Data Entry Unit (DEU) receiver hybrid output fails low.
There were no other relevant CRT select switch, P/N ME452-0102-7201, failures in
the problem data base. A toggle switch anomaly similar to this failure occurred on
STS-41 (see Section 6, Orbiter 4); however, the switch was a different dash number.
The STS-41 anomaly was attributed to a particle large enough to cause a contact-to-
contact short. There were 2 previous failures of DEU receiver hybrids, P/N
6088602; however, both were due to manufacturing defects and were considered
isolated occurrences.
The existing switch FMEA lists this type of failure as Crit 1R3. This was based on
2 keyboard entries causing an unpredictable Backup Flight System (BFS)
pre-engage response during ascent and entry. An assessment of displays presented
during nominal ascent and entry revealed no Specification (Spec)/keystroke
combinations that could result in a Crit 1/1 scenario; therefore, the current FMEA
was applicable. However, further assessment of all available vehicle displays
identified several Spec and single or double keystroke execute combinations that
could lead to a Crit 1 scenario. These displays would only be presented in
off-nominal conditions. The CRT select switch FMEA was upgraded to a Crit 1/1
CIL for STS-37. Additionally, there is a potential for a new Hazard Report to
baseline the associated risks.
4-15 STS-37 Postflight Edition
RESOLVED STS-37 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
COMMENTS/RISK ACCEPTANCE
RATIONALE
ORBITER
4 (Continued) New DPS failure could lead to a Crit 1/1
condition.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The hardware involved, CRT select switch and DEU receiver hybrid, has
demonstrated high reliability.
• The potential for a Crit 1/1 failure exists only in off-nominal scenarios.
• All Spec/keystroke combinations were identified.
• The STS-37 crew was trained to check for keyboard entries displayed
simultaneously on 2 CRTs when entering commands.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
Potential for new GPCs to erroneously
overwrite memory.
HRNo. ORBI-194{AR}
No GPC problems attributed to erroneous
memory overwrite were experienced on
STS-37.
At the Level III Orbiter Flight Readiness Review, IBM reported a generic hardware
problem with the new GPCs. The problem occurred when the transition was made
from halt (also known as sleep or freeze-dried mode) to an operational mode; the
GPC could cause random locations of memory to be overwritten. The problem was
first seen with the Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS); however, it was initially
believed to be unique to the SMS. A hardware design change was made to a single
page in the GPCs to fix this problem. Access to the GPCs in the horizontal
position is required to implement this change.
The halt position in the AP-101S (new GPC) is known as the sleep mode. During
the sleep mode, a minimum amount of power is applied to retain the memory
(approximately 56 watts vs 560 watts nominal). Since the new GPC has a
Complementary Metal Oxide Silicon (CMOS) memory that would be lost if power
is removed, FR 7-30 B was added for this first flight of the AP-101S GPCs.
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5 (Continued) Potential for new GPCs to erroneously
overwrite memory.
This FR states that "...Since removing power from the 101S GPC causes loss of
memory integrity, a 101S GPC will only be powered off under extreme power-down
conditions." However, discovery of the new memory overwrite potential was a
deterrent to putting 2 or 3 of the GPCs in the sleep or freeze-dried mode on orbit
as was planned.
The workarounds proposed for STS-37 included:
• Keeping the GPCs in the standby mode, instead of the halt or sleep mode,
so that a power transition is not required; or
• Performing Initial Program Load (IPL) from the Mass Memory Unit
(MMU) on any GPC undergoing power transition from the sleep mode
(i.e., at power-up).
The first workaround would eliminate the concern for memory overwrites but would
consume more power than planned. It was planned to put 3 GPCs in the sleep
mode when on orbit: the BFS computer and 2 of the 4 GPC redundant set. Only 2
Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) computers are nominally planned to run
on orbit to conserve power and enable the crew to "freeze-dry" the G2 [on-orbit
Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C)] on 1 machine and the G3 (entry
software) on the other "sleeping" machine. In the process used to freeze- dry an
AP-101S GPC, the GPC is loaded with the desired software configuration (G2 or
G3 in this case) and put into the sleep mode. The reason for freeze-drying is to
have a copy of critical software available without requiring access to MMUs.
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5 (Continued) Potential for new GPCs to erroneously
overwrite memory.
Human factors and timing are of concern to IPL at GPC power-up. While the IPL
is a viable workaround in any case, crew intervention is required for this
workaround option.
Because of this problem, a decision was made to configure the STS-37 GPCs on
orbit as follows:
• GPC 1 would have the on-orbit GN&C software.
• GPC 2 would be put in sleep mode when not in use. The crew would
power-up GPC 2 and perform an IPL to load the redundant GN&C
software for the planned Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) deployment
operations on the third day.
• GPC 3 would be freeze-dried for G3 and kept in the standby mode.
• GPC 4 would have the Systems Management (SM) software.
• GPC 5 was reserved for the BFS and would be put in sleep mode on orbit.
The crew would perform an IPL to load the BFS for deorbiting operations.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• A plan was in place to alleviate the need to power-down certain GPCs on
orbit.
• If unplanned or inadvertent power loss did occur, the crew could perform
the required IPL to reconfigure the GPCs.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
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6 Cabin pressure bleed valve anomalies on
OV-105.
HRNo. ORBI-074{C}
No problems with cabin pressure bleed
valves were reported on STS-37.
Three cabin pressure bleed valves installed on OV-105, S/N 5, 6, and 8, recently
failed leak tests. A fourth, S/N 7, was inspected at the manufacturer, Charlton
Technologies, Inc. (CTI), and was found to be leaking; however, the leak was within
specification. All 4 valves exhibited signs of seal debonding. Valves S/N 1 through
S/N 4 had no history of leakage or seal debond. The cause of the debonding was
not determined. The bond could be affected by either a lack of primer on the valve
or incorrect application of primer to the valve. Poor adhesion of S/N 5 through
S/N 8 molded seals, and seal leakage, was verified at CTI. Testing was inconclusive
in determining proper primer application. Records show that the seals were
molded in accordance with the applicable procedure; however, there were no
specific inspection criteria for primer application.
Historical comparison of seal material batches to seal leakage indicated no
definitive correlation. All seal materials are batch tested for correct material
properties.
For flight vehicles, cabin pressure bleed valve leak tests at 15 pounds per square
inch differential (psid) are performed every 5 flights. Maximum allowed leakage is
25 standard cubic centimeters per minute (seem). During countdown, cabin
pressure drop is monitored, with a 2-psid gross leak limit. Each valve is checked
individually after venting the cabin; there is no reverification of leakage. OV-103
valves were last leak-tested before STS-41 with no problems noted. OV-104 valves
were checked during the STS-37 flow with no anomalies. A requirement is in work
to leak check OV-102 valves prior to STS-40.
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6 (Continued) Cabin pressure bleed valve anomalies on
OV-105.
OV-104 wing strut tubes found damaged
during STS-38 postflight inspection.
HR No. ORBI-277 {C}
No anomalies attributed to wing strut tube
problems were experienced on STS-37 after
repair of the 2 dented tubes found during
STS-37 preflight inspection.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• OV-104 cabin pressure bleed valves passed all leak tests.
• Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) and FRs were in place to account for valve
leakage after turnaround testing.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
Wing strut tube damage was discovered during STS-31/OV-103 postflight
inspection. A strut tube in the OV-103 Left-Hand (LH) wing was found dented. It
was later determined to have an undersized wall thickness of 0.014"; minimum
required wall thickness is 0.018". Identification of this below-minimum wall-
thickness condition triggered a fleetwide ultrasonic inspection of all wing strut tubes
with a calculated margin of safety of 0.3S or less. OV-104 was determined to have
2 struts below the minimum margin of safety in the Right-Hand (RH) wing and 2 hi
the LH wing; 2 of the 4 were determined to have a negative margin of safety.
Doublers were installed to reinforce these 2 struts prior to STS-38/OV-104 flight.
During preflight inspection of STS-37/OV-104, 2 strut tubes were found dented.
The dented tubes were repaired using doublers (comprising hose clamps, EA934
epoxy adhesive, and 0.020" clamshell). Post-repair proof-load tests were performed,
and plans were developed to certify the strut tubes for multimission use;
certification is currently limited to 1 flight. Note that, prior to STS-38, repair of
undersized strut tubes was dispositioned as acceptable for unrestricted use; however,
a recent evaluation determined that repaired tubes should be restricted to 1 flight.
Because replacement truss tubes will not be available until June 1992, continued use
of repaired truss tubes will be made on a flight-by-flight basis following proof-load
testing.
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7 (Continued) OV-104 wing strut tubes found damaged
during STS-38 postflight inspection.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• Pre-STS-38/OV-104 wing strut tube inspection identified the location of all
undersized tubes. Doublers were installed on 2 struts with a negative
margin of safety, increasing the margin of safety to a positive level.
• The 2 dented OV-104 truss tubes found on January 31, 1991 were repaired
and successfully passed proof-load testing.
• Proof-load testing is required to clear repaired strut tubes prior to each
flight.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
New GPC, AP-101S, failure mode.
No GPC problems were reported on
STS-37.
GPC S/N 507 failed during operation in the SAIL in June 1990. S/N 507 was
reported to be unable to recover from the sleep mode. Power cycling of S/N 507
restored the GPC to normal operation. This anomaly was reported on Corrective
Action Report (CAR) #7274. S/N 507 was removed from the SAIL and returned
to IBM for troubleshooting.
Troubleshooting at IBM could not repeat the failure during vibration and thermal
testing. IBM was also unsuccessful in isolating a failure using Automatic Test
Equipment (ATE). The sleep mode logic was analyzed for a potential design flaw.
This analysis resulted in identification of the design problem addressed in Section 4,
Orbiter 5. Because no failure could be isolated at IBM, S/N 507 was returned to
the SAIL and operated for over 500 hours (hr) without a repeat of the earlier
failure.
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8 (Continued) New GPC, AP-101S, failure mode. A recent review of SAIL videotape showed that the S/N 507 mode switch was in
the "run" position instead of the "sleep" position when the June 1990 failure
occurred. This finding indicated the potential for a generic power supply problem
in the AP-101S GPCs. S/N 507 will be returned to IBM for additional testing and
troubleshooting that will focus on GPC power supply operation and functionality. If
the failure cannot be duplicated or isolated at IBM, the S/N 507 power supplies will
be removed from flight status. There have been 2 previous AP-101S power supply
failures, both in qualification units. These 2 qualification failures had different
causes and effects; both resulted in design or procedural fixes.
Rationale for STS-37 flight with new GPCs was:
• There was no failure history of new, flight-unit GPC power supplies.
• New GPCs installed on OV-103 were extensively tested with no similar
problems.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
Indications of voids and debris found in
review of STS-37/OV-104 Nose Landing
Gear (NLG) holograms.
HR No. ORBI-185 {C}
No tire problems were experienced on
STS-37/OV-104 subsequent to replacement
of a defective RH NLG tire.
Debris was found in an STS-39/OV-103 NLG tire. Holograms of all fleet NLG
tires were reviewed, and all NLG tires in inventory at KSC were x-rayed for debris.
Holography techniques are used to inspect NLG tires, and the combination of x-ray
and holographic inspection should find any abnormalities. The RH OV-104 NLG
tire holograms indicated a void in the sidewall. No discrepancy was written at the
time that the original hologram was evaluated; however, the inspector did indicate
the presence of the void in the inspection report. The OV-104 RH NLG tire was
replaced with a spare that passed holographic and x-ray inspection.
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9 (Continued) Indications of voids and debris found in
review of STS-37/OV-104 NLG
holograms.
Holograms of the LH OV-104 NLG tire indicated that it had no voids or debris.
Recent x-ray inspection of this tire found an indication of a piece of wire in the tire
carcass measuring 0.1" in length and 0.02" in diameter. This finding, however, was
not made until after the STS-37/OV-104 NLG wheel well was closed out for flight.
The debris problem appears to be generic because 11 of 19 tires recently x-rayed
showed signs of embedded debris. A review of the operational history of the
11 NLG tires found with debris indicated that 3 tires had flown five missions with
embedded debris; 2 of the 3 had flown 2 missions each. Debris found in the
OV-104 LH NLG was smaller than debris found in the 3 flown tires. There were
no failures or anomalies in the Space Shuttle Program flight history. Based on this
history, and the fact that NLG tires have performed well with embedded debris, it
was believed that the debris in the OV-104 LH NLG would not lead to tire failure.
This tire was removed from the inventory upon return of STS-37/OV-104.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The OV-104 RH NLG tire was found to have no voids or debris.
• Based on fleet history of NLG tires flown with embedded debris, the debris
found in the OV-104 LH NLG would not lead to tire failure.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
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10 A Main Propulsion System (MPS) 3-way
helium solenoid valve failed leak tests on
OV-102.
HR No. ORBI-108E {AR}
ORBI-129A {C}
No MPS helium leaks were experienced on
STS-37.
MPS leak tests on OV-102 after the STS-35 flight isolated a leak to a 3-way helium
solenoid valve, LV68, that is used in the 17" disconnect latch unlock. Additional
tests confirmed the leak and further isolated it to a crack in the valve bellows.
Similar 3-way helium solenoid valves are used in 46 locations in the MPS. The
valves control helium pressure to open or close pneumatically-operated MPS valves.
The concern here was that a worst-case failure of a helium valve could lead to
helium leakage or valve rupture and result in a Crit 1 failure. This failure scenario
was believed to potentially deplete the onboard helium supply, resulting in the
inability to close prevalves at Main Engine Cutoff (MECO) and the potential for
Main Engine (ME) turbopump overspeed and explosion. LV68 was removed for
evaluation and replaced. Retests indicated that the replacement valve was not
leaking.
Helium solenoid valve bellows are 2-ply (nickel and copper plies) and are fabricated
by an electroforming/electroplating process. Convoluted plies are soldered to end
fittings to complete the bellows assembly. In normal operation, the valve bellows
assembly is pressurized by solenoid inlet pressure. Internal bellows pressure and
spring rate provide the forces necessary to maintain the valve in the closed position
when the solenoid is deenergized. Bellows assemblies are proofed at 1550 pounds
per square inch (psi), more than twice the operating pressure. Bellows assemblies
are reproofed after solder rework; therefore, a valve could be subjected to multiple
proof-pressure tests.
Initial teardown and inspection of the failed LV68 valve identified a deformation, or
squirm, in the bellows that was caused by buckling instability. Further examination
found a circumferential crack on the bellows convolute crown. The crack was
approximately 0.150" in length and was on the tension side of the squirm. Leak
checks measured the leak rate to be 22 standard cubic feet per minute (scfm)
4-24 STS-37 Postflight Edition
RESOLVED STS-37 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
COMMENTS/RISK ACCEPTANCE
RATIONALE
ORBITER
10 (Continued) An MPS 3-way helium solenoid valve
failed leak tests on OV-102.
at 300 psi. Extrapolation to 750-psi operating pressure predicted a leak rate of
54 scfm. The maximum leak allowed is 10 standard cubic centimeters per second
(sees) from the valve vent port.
Metallurgical analysis determined that the crack was 80% through the inner bellows
ply and was due to fatigue. Final separation in each ply was determined to be due
to overload. The crack did, however, coincide with a small void in the copper
strike. Other cracks were discovered in adjacent convolutes. These cracks
propagated from the inner diameter toward similar voids in the copper strike.
Vendor stress analysis indicated that the bellows design was marginal for the
1550-psi proof test. Predictions were that the internal pressure required to initiate
squirm deformation is 1551 psi. A more conservative analysis indicated that the
pressure needed to initiate squirm is much lower than 1500 psi. The potential
effects of a squirmed bellows on valve operation was evaluated.
The investigation into this failure considered the potential for a lot-related failure
mode. The failed bellows was manufactured in 1987 in a lot of 7 bellows, a start-up
lot after a 5-year layoff. Records indicated that the failed bellows, and all other
bellows in the lot, had been subjected to 3 proof tests because of required solder
rework. A second bellows from the lot of 7 is installed in the Liquid Oxygen side
outboard fill and drain valve on OV-103. The outboard fill and drain valve on
OV-103 will be replaced prior to STS-39 flight. Of the 5 remaining bellows from
the lot, 4 were scrapped and the fifth was rejected at KSC after the valve failed
helium signature tests. This valve also showed signs of squirming.
The investigation also determined that solenoid valve certification tests were
inadequate for verifying bellows life. Certification testing included 12,000 valve
operation cycles; however, only 50 pressure cycles were performed. Pressure cycling
is believed to be the primary contributor to bellows squirming and fatigue.
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10 (Continued) An MPS 3-way helium solenoid valve
failed leak tests on OV-102.
No other solenoid valve bellows failures were recorded during flight or ground
checkout. This history includes a significant number of valve cycles and operations.
Bellows problems were, however, encountered during the production of the OV-10S
bellows assemblies in 1989. In this case, initial production runs were scrapped.
OV-105 bellows failures were not the result of cracked bellows; however, the
bellows were found squirmed and dimensionally unstable after repeated proof-
pressure tests. All OV-105 bellows were reworked because of solder problems
induced by numerous process and personnel deficiencies at the vendor.
Prelaunch and operational procedures are in place to control potential helium leaks
through the valve bellows. Prior to launch, excessive helium loss is detected by the
Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS) and, if aft compartment helium
concentrations exceed the 10,000-parts per million (ppm) LCC limit, the launch is
scrubbed. After launch, helium tank pressures are monitored by the Caution and
Warning System (CWS). An alarm sounds if helium tank pressures drop below
3800 psi. If this occurs during ascent, the crew is required to manually close
isolation valves LV7 and LV8 to conserve helium. LV7 and LV8 would be
reopened along with LV10 (engine crossover) at MECO minus 30 sec. These
actions are intended to conserve sufficient helium stores to enable engine prevalve
closure at MECO.
Analysis performed by Johnson Space Center (JSC) determined that the worst-case
inflight leakage due to a ruptured bellows is manageable. The leak rate, restricted
by a 0.0930" diameter passage in the valve, was calculated to be 260 scfm. This leak
rate would not deplete the helium supply during ascent; therefore, sufficient helium
would remain in the system to shut engine prevalves at MECO. Additionally, a
260-scfm leak would not provide sufficient helium to overpressurize the aft
compartment.
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10 (Continued) An MPS 3-way helium solenoid valve
failed leak tests on OV-102.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The 3-way helium solenoid valves had a highly reliable history prior to the
cracked bellows found on OV-102. This history included 46 valves installed
and operated on 37 Space Shuttle missions.
• There were no bellows from the suspect lot installed on OV-104.
• Processing flow leak checks and prelaunch HGDS monitoring have the
capability to identify leaks. If a leak were to occur after launch, CWS
monitoring would alert the crew to take action to conserve the helium
supply.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
11 Gaseous Hydrogen (GH2) Flow Control
Valve (FCV) weld crack found on
OV-103.
HR No. ORBI-306 {AR}
No GH2 FCV problems were experienced
on STS-37.
During STS-39/OV-103 preparations, a small leak was detected at the engine #1
GH2 FCV housing during mass spectrometer leak tests of the OV-103 GH2
pressurization system. These tests were performed as part of the investigation into
the high Hydrogen (H2) concentration measured in the OV-103 aft compartment
during STS-41 ascent. The leak was measured at 2.3 x 10"6 sees, in excess of the
1 x 10"* sees specification limit. Initial calculations indicated that this leak rate was
significant enough to account for the H2 concentrations measured during STS-41;
however, a more formal calculation of potential leak rates was performed. Analysis
indicated that a worst-case leak through a circumferential crack would not provide
sufficient H2 to reach aft compartment flammability concentrations. Initial
examination of the FCV found the leak source to be a 3/8" crack in the housing
outlet tube weld. This weld is a sealing weld only and provides no structural
integrity.
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11 (Continued) GH2 FCV weld crack found on OV-103. Examination of the cracked FCV housing outlet tube weld at RI indicated that weld
quality was good (good penetration, no evidence of material defect, and good weld
blend). Structural analysis determined the failure mechanism to be High-Cycle
Fatigue (HCF). The source of the fatigue has not been determined; however, loads
induced in the high-vibration environment is the leading candidate. Investigation
into potential vibration sources is underway. Evaluation of GH2 and Gaseous
Oxygen (GO2) qualification FCV housings for similar fatigue conditions is in work.
Leak tests and Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) methods will be employed on the
qualification housings.
Visual inspection of OV-104 FCV outlet tube welds by MPS engineers did not
reveal signs of cracks. OV-104 FCV housings had flown only 7 flights; the OV-103
FCV housing with the weld crack was the fleet leader with 11 flights. Mass
spectrometer leak checks were performed; no problems or out-of-specification leaks
were found.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• Mass spectrometer and visual inspections found no indication of leaks in
OV-104 FCVs.
• A worst-case circumferential crack would not provide sufficient H2 to reach
aft compartment flammability concentrations.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
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12 Clogged APU #3 lube oil filter on
OV-104.
HRNo. ORBI-036{AR}
ORBI-121 {AR}
STS-37/OV-104 System #3APU/Water
Spray Boiler (WSB lube ml temperature
ran cooler than the other 2 systems.
WSB #3 overcoating was experienced both
post-MECO and during entry (IFA No.
STS-37-V-12). This anomalous WSB
operation was believed to be due to lube
oil wax contamination. The problem was
probably exacerbated by the inability to
perform a hot-oil flush of contamination
from APU #3 at the pad prior to launch.
Anomalous operation was also experienced
on WSB #2 during STS-37 ascent;
WSB #2 failed to cool APU #2 (IFA No.
STS-37-V-Q2). The cause was attributed to
freezing of the spray bar due to wax
buildup in WSB #2. Investigation into
APU/WSB combinations that displayed
similar problems is in work.
During hot-fire of APU #3, S/N 307, at the pad, gearbox lube oil pressure peaked
at 108 psia. High gearbox pressure is an indication of the presence of wax buildup
and the potential for a clogged filter. Gear box pressure is nominally 50 psia during
APU operation. A clogged filter could cause WSB spray bar freeze-up and an
over-temperature condition of the APU post-MECO. Wax, in the form of
pentaerythritol, is formed when APU hydrazine fuel reacts with APU lube oil.
Pentaerythritol has 2 basic constituents: a soft, waxy-type substance and crystals.
The waxy substance and crystals melt in the lube oil when temperatures exceed
200°F.
Several sources of contamination are possible. The most likely source is leakage
across the fuel pump seal. During recent GGVM liquid leak checks on OV-104,
fuel pump seal leakage was indicated by a decrease in the fuel pump inlet pressure
and an associated increase in the seal cavity pressure. Another potential source of
the wax contamination is the open loop hot-oil flushing procedure recently
performed on WSB #3. A temperature of at least 250 "F is required to flush wax
from the WSB tube bundle. The open-loop technique flush temperatures only
reach 150 °F. As a result of using this flush procedure, contamination from the
WSB tube bundle could have been deposited on the lube oil filter. Both APU #3
and WSB #3 were considered contaminated with wax.
The OMRSD requires a hot-oil flush if evidence of filter clogging is present.
However, an APU hot-oil flush has never been performed in the vertical position;
an OMRSD procedure would have to be written to accomplish the flush. The
decision was made to drain the lube oil from APU #3 and replace the lube oil
filter.
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12 (Continued) Clogged APU #3 lube oil filter on
OV-104.
Examination found approximately 7 grams of crystalline pentaerythritol clogging the
filter; experience shows that 2 to 3 grams of normal debris trapped in the filter
would cause lube oil pressures to exceed 50 psi. APU #3 and WSB #3 were still
considered to be contaminated after replacement of the lube oil and filter because a
hot oil flush was not performed. An OMRSD waiver was approved to acknowledge
this condition, which has the potential for decreasing WSB #3 efficiency and could
result in freeze-up of the WSB spray bar.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• APU #3 lube oil and filter were replaced. An OMRSD waiver for non-
performance of the hot-oil flush was approved.
• For a nominal ascent, contamination is not a concern.
• LCC limits gearbox pressure to 110 psia prior to launch.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
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13 Debris found in STS-37/OV-104
window #1.
HR No. ORBI-208 {AR}
ORBI-339 {AR}
No further window problems wen
experienced on STS-37 after replacement of
the window #1 thermal pane. The RTV
debris found during prelaunch inspection at
the pad did not affect window #1 cavity
venting during ascent or entry.
During STS-37/OV-104 window inspection at the pad, 3 small pieces of Room-
Temperature Vulcanizing (RTV) were found between the outer thermal pane glass
and the inner pressure pane glass. The largest piece of RTV was estimated to be
3" long and 1/4" wide. The debris was located on the ledge between the outer
thermal pane and the inner pressure pane. No debris was witnessed in the window
cavity vent area. The concern was that the debris could block the window cavity
vents during either ascent or descent.
The window #1 thermal pane was replaced during the STS-37 flow because of
damage determined to be greater in depth than allowed by specification. After
installation of the new thermal pane, inspection was performed in the horizontal
position, and no debris was identified. The debris found during the inspection at
the pad most likely shifted when OV-104 was taken to the vertical position.
Analysis determined that there was no mechanism (i.e., air flow out of the cavity or
vibration) that would move the existing debris to the ascent vent. Gravitational
forces induced during ascent would force the debris to remain in its current
position. On orbit, the debris has the potential to migrate freely, however, this is
not expected to cause visibility impairment or other problems. Air flow through the
descent vent is into the cavity. If the debris migrates to the descent vent while on
orbit, it is not of sufficient size to overcome the air flow and block the vent.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• Through analysis, the debris was not expected to migrate to the window
cavity vents during ascent. Air flow into the cavity during descent would
move the debris away from the descent vent.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
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1 High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
(HPOTP) first-stage turbine disc
cracking.
HR No. ME-C1 (All Phases) {AR}
No SSME anomalies were reported on
STS-37.
Dye-penetrant inspection of 4 HPOTP first-stage turbine discs identified radial
cracks in the interstage pilot rib. Gradient oxide discoloration was found in 2
cracks. These cracks were not detected or obvious prior to removal of the gold
plating. The high-time HPOTP, where the cracks were first found, was the fleet
leader with 21,908 sec and 52 starts. It had been removed from the flight program
for a long time. Seventeen turbine discs were inspected to date; 7 were found with
radial cracks in the interstage pilot rib.
Materials and Processing (M&P) analysis determined that the cracks initiated
midspan in the disc and extended either to the outboard or inboard corner of the
pilot rib. Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) inspection of the fractures
indicated a brittle crystallographic appearance. The fracture mode showed the
effects of H2 influence, indicating probable LCF or sustained load crack
propagation. Structural analysis indicated a cyclic strain range, overwhelmingly
dominated by thermal shock at shutdown, caused by H2 cooling of the hot disc.
Peak strain was determined through tests to follow a minimum of 40 to. 100 sec of
operation, or when the disc reaches steady-state high operational temperature.
Evaluation of the correlation of LCF analysis to this failure mode indicated that the
worst-case thermal shock strain range was insufficient to result in cracking without
H2 embrittlement.
Deviation Approval Request (DAR) #2474 for fatigue damage ratio was
reevaluated for STS-39/OV-103 HPOTP first-stage turbine discs. To date, the
lowest damage ratio for a disc found with radial cracks was 1.0. All previously
flown discs had a damage ratio margin >4. This was true for 2 of 3 discs on
STS-39. However, the damage ratio of turbine disc S/N 2702270, engine #2026,
HPOTP #2226R3, was calculated to be 0.258 post-STS-39 flight. Because this was
below the damage ratio margin of 4, the DAR #2474 limit was increased to allow a
postflight damage ratio of 0.27. This action cleared turbine disc S/N 2702270 for
flight.
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1 (Continued) HPOTP first-stage turbine disc cracking. The continued evaluation of the DAR limit for turbine discs on STS-37 and future
missions led to an additional change in the criteria. Rocketdyne updated the
previous DAR to deal with HPOTP turbine disc cracking by utilizing a statistical
analysis method rather than the damage fraction method. This revision changed the
DAR criteria from 0.27 damage fraction in the interstage seal pilot rib location to a
life-limit of 14 starts (the HPOTP/turbine disc must be operated in excess of 20 sec
to be counted as a start). This DAR life limit is based on a fleet leader approach
used for other SSME components. The 14-start life limit is half the lowest number
of starts (29) for a turbine disc found with cracks. Fleet history showed 44 discs
with greater than 14 starts, and 24 discs with greater than 28 starts. Discs examined
to date with 12, 15, 18, and 19 starts showed no cracks. Turbine discs in
STS-37/OV-104 HPOTPs had no more than 11 starts.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• HPOTPs on OV-104 did not exceed the 14-start DAR limit for STS-37.
• Fleet history encompassed all significant LCF variables.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
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2 Suspected contamination of engine #2029
HPOTP.
HR No. ME-C1 (All Phases) {AR}
No SSME anomalies wen reported on
STS-37.
During leak test operations on STS-39/OV-103 engine #2029 in the Orbiter
Processing Facility (OPF), the potential existed for introducing contamination into
the engine's HPOTP. It was determined that an improper Ground Support
Equipment (GSE) configuration was used for the leak test. As part of the MPS
leak tests, tygon tubing from the Captive Air Vent (CAV) system is attached to the
HPOTP intermediate seal dram line to vent helium outside the OPF in order to
lower the helium background level. Upon disconnect of the tygon tube, positive
pressure was observed flowing from the CAV tube in the form of a mist (visible
air). The visible air was originally reported to be a hydraulic fluid mist. The
potential also existed for introducing contamination bto STS-37/OV-104 engines
during STS-38 and STS-41 postflight drying operations.
Swab samples were taken from STS-37 engines prior to installation. Engines #2019
and #2107 were found acceptable. Initial samples from engine #2031 indicated the
presence of 1.8-2.3 milligrams per square foot (mg/ft2) of hydrocarbons; the limit is
1.0 mg/ft2. Further samples taken from engine #2031 were analyzed and found to
be good. The Liquid Oxygen (LOX) drain lines were removed from engine #2031,
flushed with freon, and sampled. The results of the post-flush samples were good,
and the drain lines were reinstalled.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• Any contamination introduced into the HPOTP or engine would be
detected in the swab sample testing; none was detected in engines #2019
and #2107. Contamination found in engine #2031 was flushed out.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
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3 Pogo standpipe thermal insulator may
have been inadvertently removed during
final engine assembly.
HR No. INTG-005 {C}
No SSME anomalies were reported on
STS-37.
Rocketdyne recently disclosed that an engine assembly mechanic stated that he
removed the thermal insulator (teflon sleeve) from the pogo standpipe on engines
#2028 and #0215. The mechanic stated that he thought the sleeve was a shipping
protector. Subsequent inspection of the pogo standpipe on engine #0215 confirmed
that the teflon sleeve was not present. Early pogo system development tests
demonstrated the need for the standpipe thermal insulator to prevent Gaseous
Oxygen (GOX) from condensing on the cold standpipe surface. Thermal analysis is
underway to determine the delta temperature of the standpipe surface with and
without the teflon insulator.
Because of this finding, inspection of the STS-37 engine pogo standpipe was
required. Pogo standpipe insulation was visually verified to be in place on all
STS-37/OV-104 engines.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
Potential for pad abort caused by purge
check valve seat leakage.
HR No. ME-A1S Rev. F
No SSME anomalies were repotted on
STS-37.
During a test firing of engine #0213 at Stennis Space Center (SSC), excessive Main
Combustion Chamber (MCC) dome purge check valve leakage resulted in violation
of the 50-psia ignition confirmation redline; the engine shut down. Post-test
investigation determined that the check valve leakage was caused by an Inco-718
particle lodging on the valve seat. The particle, 0.054" x 0.040" x 0.02", resulted in a
leak through the valve of 11.5-12.5 scfm at 25 pounds per square inch gage (psig).
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4 (Continued) Potential for pad abort caused by purge
check valve seat leakage.
No similar leakage had been recorded in the flight program (132 engine starts),
including 108 oxidizer purge check valves. However, this was the sixth occurrence
during the ground test program (1808 tests). Records indicated that 2 cases were
caused by Kel-F contamination from the MCC dome purge pressure actuated valve
(which led to a pressure-actuated valve redesign), 2 were caused by contamination
originating external to the engine, and the last from contamination of an
undetermined source. In the most recent case, the source of the Inco-718 particle is
unknown. Inco-718 is used in the helium precharge valve housing and the fuel
preburaer purge pressure actuated valve. The particle found did not resemble a
machining chip or burr. The helium precharge valve was installed on test 904-087,
3 tests prior to the most recent engine #0213 test. The purge line was disconnected
at the helium precharge valve during HPOTP replacement.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• Existing SSME assembly/disassembly procedures at KSC protect the
engines from contamination entry. All joints are cleaned before
disassembly, and open ports are covered with Aclar film and polyethene
foam.
• OV-104 SSME check valves successfully passed reverse seat leak checks
after the last engine hot-fire.
• There were no similar occurrences affecting the redline margins.
• Worst-case failure is a pad abort.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
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5 Potential for loss of SSME controller
redundancy.
HR No. INTG-165 {C}
No SSME anomalies wen repotted on
STS-37.
During flight readiness testing of STS-37/OV-104, engine #2031, SSME controller
Unit Number (U/N) F27, channel B halted when powered up. Analysis of the
controller memory dump indicated an echo check failure after loading of the
channel B output electronics storage register. A change in the storage register is
indicative of a hardware failure. Repeated attempts to reproduce this failure were
unsuccessful. U/N F27 was removed from engine #2031 and replaced with
U/N F29. This was the fifth storage register failure detected during ground
checkout. There had been no storage register-related failures during SSME starts
for flight. The worst-case failure of this type is loss of SSME controller
redundancy. If this was to occur between SSME start and SRB ignition, the result
would be a pad abort.
U/N F27 was returned to Honeywell, the vendor, on January 31, 1991. Upon initial
powerup, the failure repeated. However, it did not repeat during subsequent cold
starts, thermal cycles, or vibration testing. Additional destructive analysis was
planned.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• U/N F27 was replaced with U/N F29; no additional anomalies were
experienced.
• Checks at T-34 hours prior to launch verified all SSME controller
hardware functions.
• There have been no related failures during SSME starts at launch.
• Worst-case failure would be loss of SSME controller redundancy.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
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6 HPOTP second-stage turbine blades
found rubbing coolant jet tubes on
U/N6009.
HRNo. ME-C1A Rev. F {AR}
(All Phases)
No SSME anomalies were reported on
STS-37.
Normal disassembly of HPOTP U/N 6009 found that the second-stage blades
rubbed 3 of 19 coolant jet tubes. Approximately 0.012" was removed from the
rubbed tubes. There was believed to be no structural damage, and no effect on
performance was experienced. Only minor damage to the blade shank was noted.
SEM inspection of the blade found random surface cracks up to 0.005" long.
Comparable cracks are usually experienced with the normal casting process. These
cracks were not detectable with optics or IVc penetrant.
There have been multiple cases of second-stage turbine blades rubbing. Minimum
clearance occurs between the disc stiffening rib and the turbine housing during the
shutdown transient. The original height of the jets was a maximum of 0.012" above
the print dimension. Worst-case interference with the jet is 0.014"; this would be
detected by turbine shaft micro-travel inspection. Structural analysis indicated
adequate margin with the presence of rubbed blades.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• Blade rubbing was considered benign; damage to the second-stage turbine
blades was acceptable.
• Cracks observed on U/N 6009 were less than the dynamic threshold flaw
size.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
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7 Engine #0213, G-15 seal failed during
ground testing at SSC.
HRNo. ME-D3C Rev. F {AR}
ME-D3M Rev. F {AR}
No SSME anomalies were reported on
STS-37.
During scheduled inspection of the MCC and nozzle on development engine #0213
at SSC, the G-15 seal was found cracked and buckled. This seal had been in place
for 34 tests and 15,114 sec of operation. Nozzle 4011 on engine #0213
encompassed the maximum effective protrusion in the fleet. It had been removed
from flight status because it exceeded the DAR limit. No leaks through the G-15
seal were evident during pre- and post-test leak checks. Bluing and cracking of the
G-15 seal was expected prior to nozzle removal based on extended monitoring of
deteriorating or missing Flow Recirculation Inhibitor (FRI), but not to the extent
witnessed on disassembly. Seal cracking and erosion are the result of hot-gas
ingestion into the G-15 cavity. Diversion of hot-gas flow into the G-15 cavity
requires large physical tube protrusions or hydraulic protrusion from multiple-
vented tubes or eroded tube crowns. These protrusions are considered outside of
the DAR limit.
All STS-37/OV-104 SSMEs were verified not to have coolant tube erosion or
vented tubes. There was no degradation or missing FRI on any OV-104 nozzle.
Tube protrusions and hot-fire time on STS-37/OV-104 engines were well within
DAR limits. The G-15 seals were leak checked since the last engine hot-fire.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• Conditions surrounding the G-15 seal on engine #0213 were known and
were outside established DAR limits for flightworthy SSME components.
• STS-37/OV-104 G-15 seals were leak checked.
• Components on STS-37/OV-104 SSMEs were well within DAR limits.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
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1 SRB APU speed trace anomaly during
Acceptance Checkout (AGO).
HR No. A-20-16 Rev. C-DCN3 {C}
B-20-22 Rev. B-DCN3 {C}
No problems were experienced with SRB
APUs on STS-37.
Post-hot-fire data review of APU S/N 155 during ACO for STS-48/BI-047 SRBs at
United Space Boosters, Inc., (USBI) found that the GSE speed trace indicated
anomalous data during APU turbine wheel spindown. The speed trace anomaly
occurred between 29,000 and 21,000 revolutions per minute (rpm) for approximately
1 sec. Anomalous indications were on the Magnetic Pickup Unit (MPU)-l GSE
data trace. Two MPUs per APU provide speed indication to the SRB Integrated
Electronics Assembly (IEA) via the APU controller to monitor and control turbine
underspeed and overspeed conditions. In this instance, the anomaly was not, and
would not be, detected by the IEA because the APU controller shuts down when
the APU turbine wheel is at 40,000 rpm. Loss of signal from either MPU prior to
T-0 results in a launch scrub/abort. Loss of MPU-1 signal during flight results in
high-speed APU operation under the control of MPU-2 at 112%. Loss of MPU-2
signal during flight results in loss of valve redundancy on that APU.
Electrical isolation tests of the control circuit and GSE were performed; no
anomalies were identified. GSE self-tests and tests on the SRB side of the interface
were performed with no problems. A second APU hot-fire was performed, and the
anomalous speed traces recurred. A third hot-fire test was performed with the
MPU-1 and MPU-2 output cables swapped at the APU. During the third test,
anomalous speed traces remained with the MPU-1 output in the GSE circuit only.
In this case, however, anomalous MPU-1 speed traces were witnessed during both
APU startup and spindown. APU S/N 155 was removed from BI-047 and sent to
Sundstrand, the vendor, for further analysis. Subsequent hot-fire tests with APU
S/N 132 installed were successful, exonerating the APU controller, signal
conditioner, Multiplexer-Demultiplexer (MDM), flight cables, and GSE from
suspicion.
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1 (Continued) SRB APU speed trace anomaly during
AGO.
At Sundstrand, proper installation of the speed sensor assembly connector and
MPU continuity, resistance, and insulation resistance were verified to be good.
Review of APU S/N155 acceptance test history found no anomalies. A non-hot-fire
turbine spin of APU S/N 155 was performed with Gaseous Nitrogen (GNj); no
MPU-1 or MPU-2 output data problems were experienced. A hot-fire test was
performed on March 12, 1991, and again no anomalies were recorded. Data from
the hot-fire test at Sundstrand were considered to be of higher fidelity than data
recorded during a hot-fire test at USBI. The high-fidelity data were taken to USBI
and run through the AGO instrumentation to determine if the original problem was
there. Teardown inspection of APU S/N 155 components was completed with no
problems found.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• This anomaly was screenable at AGO; STS-37/BI-042 APU-ACO data
indicated no anomalies.
• Loss of MPU signal prior to T-0 results in a launch scrub/abort.
• Loss of signal in either MPU results in a fail-safe condition.
• The APU S/N 155 anomaly did not manifest at nominal turbine speeds,
only at startup and spindown.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
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2 Thrust Vector Control (TVC) hydraulic
reservoir found with 1/4" nut wedged
between piston and cylinder head.
HRNo. B-20-20 Rev. C {C}
B-20-21 Rev. B-DCN6 {C}
No TVC problems were experienced on
STS-37.
During disassembly of a hydraulic reservoir at USBI Florida Operations, a 1/4" nut
was found wedged between the piston and the low-pressure cylinder head. The nut
was similar to that used extensively in the aft skirt; 2 are located on a tube bracket
installed directly above the reservoir. During reservoir installation, the Operation
and Maintenance Instruction (OMI) prohibits removal of reservoir plugs until tube
installation is complete. The nut was covered by a black, soot-like coating similar to
that seen in the aft skirt post-SRB fire. Initial assessment by USBI determined that
the 1/4" nut could have entered the reservoir when it was removed from the STS-28
SRB, the last mission that the reservoir was used. Examination of the nut also
found signs of previous torque history.
Hydraulic reservoirs, along with other SRB hydraulic components, are normally
disassembled, inspected, and refurbished after each flight. This particular reservoir
experienced extensive testing at USBI Florida Operations and Arkwin, the vendor,
since STS-28. Arkwin indicated that they do not stock this nut. Bracket
components, including the nut, are supplied in kits, and a review at USBI Florida
Operations found no nuts missing from kits.
USBI performed a flow analysis of the hydraulic system. This analysis found
insufficient flow through the reservoir to carry debris, such as the 1/4" nut, from the
reservoir to the pump.
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2 (Continued) TVC hydraulic reservoir found with
1/4" nut wedged between piston and
cylinder head.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The nut probably got into the reservoir during postflight disassembly.
• Reservoir installation performed per OMI reduced the potential for
introduction of foreign material by requiring proximity component
installation to be complete prior to reservoir plug removal.
• Flow analysis indicated insufficient flow to propel the nut from the
reservoir to the hydraulic pump.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
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1 Test and Evaluation Motor (TEM)-7
fixed housing ablative liner debond.
HR No. BN-08 Rev. C {C}
No similar Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)
anomalies were reported on STS-37.
Post-test examination of the TEM-7 nozzle revealed 100% debond of the fixed
housing ablative liner from the metal housing. Erosion of the 4 ground-test
pressure transducer metal fittings was also witnessed. Investigation revealed that
the debond was related to the ground-test configuration (pressure transducer
fittings); these fittings are not used on inflight nozzles. Oval-shaped sooted flow
areas were found around all 4 pressure transducer ports. There was no evidence,
however, of hot-gas flow entering the liner/metal housing interface at the ends of
the phenolic liner. There was no flight history of fixed housing ablative liner-to-
metal housing debonds.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The debonds experienced were unique to the test configuration.
• Flight and static test history revealed no evidence of the TEM-7 type
debond.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
Inner Boot Ring (IBR) bond line
separation on STS-38 RH SRM.
HR No. BN-08 Rev. C. {C}
No similar SRM anomalies were
experienced on STS-37.
The IBR fixed-housing bond line on the STS-38 RH SRM was found to be
approximately 80% separated during a special investigation conducted at postflight
disassembly. There were splashdown-related impact marks made by snubber
retainer bolts on the bearing end ring in the 270° region. This is indicative of high
water-impact loads.
The IBR and fixed-housing insulation remained in position; no displacement or
edge separations were observed. Removal of IBR and fixed-housing insulation by
machining revealed the IBR bond line separation. The IBR remained bonded to
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SRM
2 (Continued) IBR bond line separation on STS-38 RH
SRM.
the metal housing in the 90° region. The IBR remained bonded to the fixed-
housing insulation, and the fixed-housing insulation was well bonded to the metal
housing. No soot or combustion products were found in the separated bond line; it
remained intact and/or the ends sealed throughout motor operation. The physical
evidence was consistent with splashdown-induced damage; however, there was no
previous documentation of this type of separation.
Detailed investigation of STS-35 IBRs found bond lines completely intact.
Structural analysis predicted that the IBR fixed-housing bond line exceeded a
2.0 FOS during motor operation. The analysis indicated post-burn separation was
possible due to the splashdown environment; the potential existed for a
contaminated and thermally-degraded bond line at the time of splashdown. There
were also splashdown-induced tensile loads.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• IBR failure was due to post-motor-burn events. Snubber damage indicated
a high impact-loading event. High water-impact loads, in conjunction with
elevated bond line temperatures and contamination, could cause bond line
failure.
• IBR processing was consistent with previous successfully-flown parts.
• The flight FOS was >2.0 at the maximum potential contamination level
(60 mg/ft2).
• Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) structural analysis indicated a
potential FOS < 1.0 at water impact.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
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3 RTV was found past the primary O-ring
of nozzle joint #5 on disassembly of
TEM-7.
HRNo. BN-03 Rev. C {AR}
No similar SRM anomalies were reported
on STS-37.
Upon disassembly of TEM-7, RTV was found past the primary O-ring of nozzle
joint #5 (fixed housing-to-aft end ring). The concern was that the RTV could
prevent proper sealing of the joint #5 O-ring, allowing a gas path. This was the
first time that this condition was seen on joint #5 of a High Performance Motor
(HPM); similar conditions were seen at joints #3 and #4 on previous HPM nozzle
configurations. There were no similar occurrences on flight motors. While the
HPM configuration only has the primary O-ring, flight motors have a secondary
O-ring and bolt Stat-O-Seals. Leak tests verify the integrity of the secondary seals
after assembly of a flight motor.
RTV typically extends partially down the axial section of the joint, and sometimes
reaches the primary O-ring. The O-ring forces uncured RTV away from the seal
footprint, maintaining the sealing interface. Tests have demonstrated that the RTV
and the fluorocarbon O-ring are compatible, with no adverse effects on O-ring
sealing properties.
Under normal flight operating conditions, nozzle joint #5 primary and secondary
seal gaps close or remain stationary. The thermal environment witnessed at
joint #5 is reduced by its location behind the flex boot. Thermal analysis predicted
no heat effects on O-ring sealing if there were blowpaths to the primary O-ring.
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3 (Continued) RTV was found past the primary O-ring
of nozzle joint #5 on disassembly of
TEM-7.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• There was no history of similar conditions on flight motors.
• The flight motor configuration provides a secondary O-ring and
Stat-O-Seals for further protection.
• Leak tests verify the secondary seal integrity.
This risk factor was resolved for STS-37.
4-47 STS-37 Postflight Edition
SECTION 5
STS-35 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (EFAs) arising from the
STS-35/OV-102 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight. Each anomaly is briefly
described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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INTEGRATION
1 Backup Flight System software patch for pad B definition of 5-3
longitudinal location was incorrect.
ORBITER
1 Left Reaction Control System drain panel heater "A" was not at 5-5
normal temperature.
2 Degradation of waste water dump function. 5-6
3 -Z star tracker Serial Number 006 failed two initial self-tests. 5-8
4 Payload Bay Door environmental seal debond. 5-9
5 Water Spray Boiler #3A operation was abnormal during ascent and 5-10
entry.
6 Window W-l has a 0.15" diameter chip. 5-11
7 Water Spray Boiler #2 was subjected to abnormally large quantities 5-11
of wax.
8 Reaction Control System vernier thruster R5D failed "off1. 5-12
9 Orbiter/External Tank Liquid Oxygen aft attach/separation hole 5-13
plugger did not fully extend.
10 Right-hand stop bolt was found bent on the STS-35 centering ring of 5-14
the forward External Tank attach/separation assembly.
11 Pilot seat down-limit switch failure. 5-16
SRM
ET
Heat-affected Carbon Cloth Phenolic seen on the left Solid Rocket 5-17
Motor at nozzle joint #3.
External Tank Thermal Protection System divots found at the 5-19
intertank-to-hydrogen flange.
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1 Backup Flight System (BFS) software
patch for pad B definition of longitudinal
location was incorrect.
IFA No. STS-35-I-01
HRNo. ORBI-066{AR}
There woe no I-toad patches required to
support STS-37; therefore, no similar BFS
anomaly was experienced.
Relocation of STS-35 from pad A to pad B required an I-load software patch to
include the pad B location definition. During ascent, a difference of 143 feet (ft)
was witnessed between the position data sent from the BFS and the Primary
Avionics Software System (PASS).
Post-ascent evaluation of telemetry data identified an error in the sixth BFS
software patch for pad B. An error was found in the sixth digit of the longitude
string. Investigation determined that the error was caused by software developers at
Rockwell International (RI)/Downey who incorrectly read the Change
Request (CR). CR 90365 was faxed to RI/Downey and was used as the authority
for the I-load software patch. All who read CR 90365 interpreted the longitude
position as -1.40709036E+00; the correct value was -1.40709836E+00. Verification
of this value was not made at RI/Downey prior to incorporation into the I-load.
Verification could have been made through comparison with the electronic data set
associated with CR 90365.
The modified BFS I-load passed STS-35 certification testing. Pass/fail criteria for
downrange position at Main Engine Cutoff (MECO) command is 1600 ft; a value of
322 ft was observed and accepted during testing. The worst-case effect for
downrange position at MECO command if the position is greater than ±600 ft is
that either the External Tank (ET) would land outside the predicted footprint or
there would be insufficient propellant to continue the mission.
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1 (Continued) BFS software patch for Pad B definition
of longitudinal location was incorrect.
To ensure that conditions will not exist for future occurrence of a similar type of
error, all CRs that require I-load patches must be accompanied by the associated
electronic data set for verification.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• There were no I-load patches required to support STS-37.
• Procedures were hi place to verify I-load data if a patch was required prior
to launch.
• Large errors are detectable during I-load software certification testing.
This anomaly was resolved for STS-37.
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1 Left Reaction Control System (RCS)
drain panel heater "A" was not at normal
temperature.
IFA No. STS-35-04
No anomalous RCS heater operation was
reported on STS-37.
On orbit, the left RCS drain temperature indicated that the heater did not cycle at
the expected 56.6"F. The temperature on heater "A" went down to 52°F before the
crew was instructed to switch to heater "B". The "B" heaters operated nominally
after switchover.
Data analysis determined that the "A" heater cycled once normally prior to this
failure. On-orbit troubleshooting included switching back to heater "A" and
allowing the left RCS dram temperature to drop to 40°F, which confirmed the
failure of heater "A" to cycle properly. Because of the attitude of the vehicle, the
RCS drain temperature did not go below 40 °F for the remainder of the mission.
The Shuttle Operational Data Book (SODB) limit is +20°F; RCS oxidizer freezes
at +12°F, and the fuel freezes at -60 "F.
This was believed to be an isolated failure, with no indication of a generic problem.
The most likely cause of this anomaly was a failed thermostat. There were no
reported problems with the left RCS drain panel thermostat on previous OV-102
missions. RCS heaters are Criticality (Crit) 2R3 components. RI is currently
investigating if there are any Crit 1 applications of this thermostat.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• RCS drain heaters were redundant.
• Loss of both heaters required a preferred attitude maneuver for
temperature control [Flight Rule (FR) 6-10B].
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1 (Continued) Left RCS drain panel heater "A" was not
at normal temperature.
• If temperature control cannot be maintained with attitude maneuvering, the
worst-case effect would be mission termination (FR 6-10B).
Not a safety concern for 575-37.
Degradation of waste water dump
function.
IFA No. STS-35-05
HR No. ORBI-254 {AR}
No waste water dump problems were
experienced on STS-37.
Water from the waste water storage tank is periodically dumped overboard into
space during a nominal mission. A gradual degradation of the waste water dump
rate was noted during the first 3 dump cycles. The line was completely blocked on
the fourth dump. Inflight maintenance was performed with no success. Waste tank
offload into the Contingency Water Container (CWC) and urine collection devices
was required for the remainder of the mission. A decision was made to manifest
additional CWCs on all subsequent flights.
Similar problems on STS-32/OV-102 led to removal and cleaning of the last 22" of
the dump line. It is believed that the blockage on STS-35 was upstream of this
section.
Troubleshooting of this STS-35 anomaly found that the waste water dump line filter
had deteriorated and was the root cause of the line blockage. The filter assembly
has 3 filters (coarse, medium, and fine) and is replaced after 3 flights. It was
determined that the polyurethane filter material deteriorates after approximately
8 years. A spare filter assembly obtained from the logistics stockroom showed
similar signs of deterioration. This spare filter, manufactured in 1980, had never
been used (still in the shipping package).
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2 (Continued) Degradation of waste water dump
function.
These findings led to a check of the STS-39/OV-103 waste water dump line filter
assembly. Upon removal, it was also found to be deteriorated. The 3"-long
#3 filter (coarse) had approximately two-thirds of the material missing. When the
#2 filter (medium) was touched, it fell apart. The #1 filter (fine) was completely
gone, and a small amount of gray powder residue was found in the liquid remaining
b the filter assembly housing. The STS-39/OV-103 replacement filter was
manufactured in 1988. The STS-37/OV-104 waste water dump line filter assembly
was also inspected; it showed no degradation of any filter elements. These filter
elements were from the lot manufactured in 1988. The STS-37/OV-104 waste
water dump line was flushed and tested.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The waste water dump line filter was believed to be the cause of the
STS-35/OV-102 line blockage; STS-37/OV-104 filters were verified to be
good.
• The capacity of the waste storage tank was adequate for a minimum-
duration mission without water dump.
• Three or more failures were required to cause crew illness. A second
CWC was added to the STS-37 manifest.
Not a safety concern for STS-37.
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3 -Z star tracker Serial Number (S/N) 006
failed 2 initial self-tests.
IFANo. STS-35-10
No star tracker anomalies were reported on
STS-37.
On the initial power-up, -Z star tracker S/N 006 failed the first 2 self-tests.
Position errors were observed on the first self-test software cycle. All subsequent
software cycles indicated the correct Built-in Test Equipment (BITE) star position.
The -Z star tracker passed the third self-test and 5 additional self-test cycles.
Performance thereafter was nominal.
Initial evaluation determined that the star tracker electronics may not have
responded quickly enough to start acquisition during the first 2 self-test cycles. It
was believed that this slow response time could be a function of warmup time.
Minimum warmup time is IS minutes (min); however, the STS-3S/OV-102 star
trackers had power on for 25 min prior to the first 2 self-test cycles. This slow
response condition was seen during laboratory tests on other units; however, this
was the first occurrence in flight.
This anomaly is a Crit 1R3 failure mode. The -Y star tracker and the Crew Optical
Alignment Sight (COAS) have redundant functions to the -Z star tracker.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• There are 3 redundant strings: -Z star tracker, -Y star tracker, and COAS.
Not a safety concern for STS-37.
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4 Payload Bay Door (PLBD) environmental
seal debond.
IFA No. STS-35-16
No problems were experienced with PLBD
environmental seals on STS-37.
Postflight inspection of OV-102 found a 24" piece of the environmental seal loose
between panels #1 and #2 at the top of the right PLBD. The loose seal material
was cut off prior to the ferry flight to preclude further loosening or damage. There
was no apparent damage internal to the payload bay. This was a first-time
occurrence in this area. A 6" splice segment of the PLBD-to-aft bulkhead
environmental seal debonded on STS-41/OV-103. Evaluation of the STS-41
problem determined the cause to be improper application of the seal (bad etching
and bonding). Investigation into the cause of the STS-3S anomaly continues.
STS-37/OV-104 PLBD environmental seals were visually inspected because of the
problem experienced on STS-41. This inspection found no problems. The visual
inspection was only sufficient to indicate whether the seal was protruding from the
"monkey fur".
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• Visual inspection found no problems.
This anomaly was resolved for STS-37.
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5 Water Spray Boiler (WSB) #3A
operation was abnormal during ascent
and entry.
IFA No. STS-35-17
HR No. ORBI-036 {AR}
ORBI-121 {AR}
Similar problems were encountered with
WSB operation on STS-37 (IFA No.
STS-37-V-02A). WSB #2 did not cool
APU lube oil while under operation of
controller "A", and operation had to be
switched to controller "B* when lube oil
temperature reached 280''F. The most
probable cause of the problem was again
believed to be freezing of the spray bar
caused by wax buildup in the WSB. (See
Section 7, Orbiter 2 for more details.)
During ascent, WSB #3A did not initiate spray cooling until Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) #3 lube oil return temperature reached 277 °F. WSB cooling operations
should begin at 250 °F. During reentry operations, WSB #3A overcooled the lube
oil. A similar anomaly occurred with WSB #2A on STS-38/OV-104 (see Section 6,
Orbiter 1 for more details).
Preliminary analysis indicated that the presence of wax in the APU #3 lube oil may
have caused the spray bar to freeze. The lube oil temperature increased until the
spray bar thawed and proper cooling commenced.
A hot-oil flush will be performed during the STS-40/OV-102 turnaround process.
WSB #3A operations will be tested after the hot-oil flush.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• WSB #2A controller was replaced on STS-37/OV-104.
• Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
(OMRSD) testing on STS-37/OV-104 indicated proper WSB functioning.
• Redundant systems were available.
Not a safety concern for STS-37.
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6 Window W-l has a 0.15" diameter chip.
IFA No. STS-35-18
HR No. ORBI-009 {AR}
No window anomalies were reported on
STS-37.
Postflight inspection of the OV-102 windows revealed a chip in window W-l,
measuring 0.15" in diameter and 0.0109" in depth. A "spider web" type crack
formation was found radiating from the impact point. During the crew debriefing,
it was determined that the crew first noted the chip on Flight Day (FD) 6. It is
believed that the chip occurred during ascent. Window W-l will be removed and
replaced prior to the next OV-102 mission. Further examination of the window will
be performed to attempt to determine the cause of the chip.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
WSB #2 was subjected to abnormally
large quantities of wax.
IFA No. STS-35-19
HR No. ORBI-121 {AR}
(See Orbiter 5 in this section.)
During ascent and entry, indication of a large amount of wax was noted in the
APU #2 lube oil system. This condition subjected WSB #2 to wax in the lube oil;
therefore, WSB #2 will require a hot-oil flush during STS-40/OV-102 turnaround
processing. APU #2 will be removed and replaced during this process to comply
with life-limit criteria.
Not a safety concern for STS-37.
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8 RCS vernier thruster R5D failed "off.
IFA No. STS-35-20
HR No. ORBI-056 {C}
RCS primary thruster R1U failed "off"
during the ET separation maneuver on
STS-37 (IFA No. STS-37-V-01). However,
in this case the problem was believed to be
caused by iron nitrate contamination of the
axidizer valve poppet; pressure traces from
the R1U failure were similar to those seen
on STS-36 thruster failures that were
attributed to this type of contamination.
(See Section 7, Orbiter 2 for more details.)
There were indications of low Chamber
Pressure (PJ on STS-37/OV-104 primary
thrusters LIU and L1L during firing in the
interconnect configuration (IFA No.
STS-37-V-08). Pe in these thrusters
returned to nominal after reconfiguration to
straight feed. Contamination in the
ojddizer interconnect line was suspected.
(See Section 7, Orbiter 4 for more details.)
During orbital maneuvering, RCS vernier thruster R5D exhibited low Pc and was
deselected by Redundancy Management (RM). Data evaluation indicated that
helium was present in the crossfeed line. A similar failure was seen on STS-9.
Vernier thruster R5D was successfully hot-fired on orbit to flush out the helium.
Evaluation of the hot-fire data indicated some gas ingestion during the first pulse
and none in the 4 subsequent pulses. RM was reset following nominal performance
during the hot-fire.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• There were redundant down-firing thrusters in each Orbital Maneuvering
System (QMS) pod.
• Small helium bubbles trapped in propellant lines can be removed by hot-
firing the thrusters.
• A vernier thruster deselected because of helium bubbles can be reselected
after gas is flushed out of the system during a hot-fire.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
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9 Orbiter/ET Liquid Oxygen (LO2) aft
attach/separation hole plugger did not
fully extend.
IFA No. STS-35-21
HRNo. ORBI-302A {AR}
No problems with this hole plugger were
reported on STS-37.
The Orbiter/ET LO2 aft attach/separation hole plugger did not complete its stroke.
One of the 2 pyros was jammed between the plugger and the run of the hole. The
other pyro device was not found and may have escaped. No debris was found on
the runway after the ET doors were opened. Similar hole plugger failures occurred
on STS-29 and STS-34.
The concern was that loose debris could block the ET umbilical door from fully
closing, resulting in the potential loss of the crew and vehicle during reentry. The
likelihood of escaping fragments preventing the ET umbilical door from closing was
determined to be remote. The ET doors may be recycled in flight if closing or
latching is obstructed. The Orbiter performs a maneuver at ET separation, moving
away from the ET and escaping possible debris prior to ET umbilical door closure.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The likelihood of debris jamming the ET umbilical door is remote.
• Doors may be recycled in flight if closing or latching is obstructed.
• The ET separation burn moves the Orbiter away from any escaping debris.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
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10 Right-Hand (RH) stop bolt was found
bent on the STS-35 centering ring of the
forward ET attach/separation assembly.
IFA No. STS-35-22
HR No. INTG-051B {C}
No problems with these stop bolts were
reported on 575-37.
Postflight inspection of STS-35/OV-102 found the RH stop bolt bent approximately
5* from center. Bending of stop bolts was previously experienced on STS-34,
STS-32, and STS-38 (not reported as an IFA on STS-38/OV-104). Damage to the
STS-35/OV-102 stop bolt was worse than that seen on STS-38, but not as bad as
the STS-34 anomaly. The left and right stop bolts restrict side rotation of the
centering ring during Orbiter/ET mate. They are not designed to carry any mate
or flight loads.
Review of ground operations determined that mating and demating operations have
the physical capability to bend the stop bolts. Mating procedures were modified
after STS-34 to control the yoke position and preclude the potential for bolt damage
during mating operations. No stop bolts were reported bent during the next several
missions; however, there were no modified requirements for demating operations on
these flights. Because of the reports of bent stop bolts on STS-38 and STS-3S,
where both flows required Orbiter demate from the ET, a modified demate
procedure was developed and submitted for approval. New mate/demate Ground
Support Equipment (GSE) with improved visual and digital readout will be
available in mid-1991. Additionally, a more robust stop bolt design is in evaluation
for future use.
No anomalies were recorded during the STS-35 ET/Orbiter mating process.
Misalignment of the ET attach points, EO-2 and EO-3, was not considered a
contributor to this anomaly. A bent stop bolt is a Crit 3 failure. Analysis
conducted during the investigation of previous instances of bent or damaged stop
bolts determined that a moment of 430-2100 inch-pounds (in-lb) could locally
deform the bolt end. This moment could be generated by either side-to-side
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10 (Continued) RH stop bolt was found bent on the movement during normal handling or by the small, pyro-initiated rocking motion at
STS-35 centering ring of the forward ET separation. The rocking motion was first seen during review of pyro qualification
attach/separation assembly. test film. The bolts used in the qualification tests also exhibited local flat spots
similar to those seen on the STS-32 stop bolts. The rocking motion, however, was
determined to be insufficient to cause the bolt bending experienced on STS-34.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The bent stop bolt on STS-38/OV-104 was repaired during the
STS-37/OV-104 processing flow.
• All stop bolts, even when bent, have performed the intended function.
• Stop bolts do not carry flight loads and are nonfunctional after Orbiter/ET
mate.
• Analysis demonstrated that there were no known flight loads that could
cause stop bolt bending.
This anomaly was resolved for STS-37.
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11 Pilot seat down-limit switch failure.
IFA No. STS-35-23
HR No. ORBI-340 {AR}
No problems with the pilot seat were
reported on STS-37.
During ingress and prelaunch operations, the pilot attempted to make seat
adjustments. The pilot seat failed to drive down. This is a repeat of an STS-32
anomaly (IFA No. STS-32-27). The seat operated properly on orbit.
The down-limit switch was replaced during the STS-35 turnaround process. Further
troubleshooting will be performed at KSC. This anomaly is unique to OV-102.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• There were no problems experienced with crew seats on STS-38/OV-104.
The only operational problem history has been on OV-102.
Not a safety concern for STS-37.
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1 Heat-affected Carbon Cloth Phenolic
(CCP) seen on the left Solid Rocket
Motor (SRM) at nozzle joint #3.
IFA No. STS-35-M-01
HRNo. BN-03 Rev. C {AR}
No heat effect problems associated with the
SRM CCP were reported on STS-37.
During postflight inspection of left SRM nozzle joint #3 by Thiokol
Corporation (TC), a 1.5" gas path was observed through a Room-Temperature
Vulcanizing (RTV) void at 195° of the CCP. Surface heat effects and associated
sooting resulted. Heat effects on the virgin CCP were seen approximately
1.0" radially past the char line and appeared to be on the surface only. Soot
reached the primary O-ring, approximately 12" circumferentially in both directions
from the 195° position. There were no blowby erosion or heat effects to the
primary O-ring. Metal nozzle components were not affected.
The RTV contributes as a thermal barrier only and is not considered a seal in the
nozzle joints. RTV below the char line is a design goal only and is not a
performance requirement. To date, all RTV backfill nozzle joints have met design
requirements. No flight or static test motor nozzle joints have exhibited primary
O-ring heat effects, erosion, or blowby.
This was the first occurrence of heat-affected CCP in nozzle joint #3. Heat-
affected CCP, silica cloth phenolic, and glass cloth phenolic were seen in joint #2
(nose inlet bearing/cowl) of STS-36, QM-7, and PVM-1, all with no O-ring heat
effects. Gas paths and soot in nozzle joints were within the experience base of 26
flight SRMs and 7 static test nozzles. TC plans to conduct an aero/thermal analysis
of nozzle joint #3 to determine the gas volume and flow characteristics associated
with this STS-35 anomaly.
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1 (Continued) Heat-affected CCP seen on the left SRM
at nozzle joint #3.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• There was no history of blowby, erosion, or heat effects on the primary
O-ring experienced with gas paths through SRM nozzle RTV voids.
• The gas path and soot witnessed on STS-35 nozzle joint #3 was within the
experience base of 26 flight SRMs and 7 test motors.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
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1 ET Thermal Protection System (TPS)
divots found at the intertank-to-hydrogen
flange.
IFANo. STS-35-T-01
HR No. INTG-008B {AR}
INTG-037B {AR}
INTG-081A {AR}
No ET anomalies were reported on
STS-37.
During review of ET photographs taken by the STS-35 crew after separation,
11 circular TPS divots were observed. All were located on the intertank-to-
hydrogen flange. Six divots were on the left side of the tank; the other 5 were on
the right side. The divots were estimated to be from 7" to 10" in diameter.
The ET intertank flanges are closed out after the splice/mate of the LO2 tan^ to
the Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) tank. The intertank flanges are then manually sprayed
with BX-2SO foam, which is bonded to existing tank foams by an isochem adhesive.
Adhesive voids cannot be detected by visual inspection, and there is currently no
available nondestructive test to verify proper adhesion. Martin Marietta
Corporation (MMC) is reviewing STS-37/ET-37 build paper for potential
anomalies; however, nothing of significance is expected to be found.
Review of similar photographs from STS-28 found a large divot in the ET intertank
acreage TPS. This divot was estimated at 23" x 15" and >1" in depth. No
conclusion was reached as to the cause of the STS-28 divot; however, when possible,
all crews have been asked to photograph the ET after separation. The divots seen
on STS-35 were the first experienced since STS-28.
Review of the STS-35 ET photographs by MMC determined that the divots did not
expose ET tank metal. The "whitish" color was believed to be fresh BX-250 foam
that was not exposed to the weather. Worst-case analysis performed by MMC
indicated that bare ET tank metal of the divot sizes seen on STS-35 would not
result in structural or thermal problems.
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1 (Continued) ET TPS divots found at the intertank-to-
hydrogen flange.
Rationale for STS-37/ET-37 flight was:
• No anomalous conditions were reported during the manufacturing and
testing of ET-37.
• MMC worst-case analysis determined that no structural or thermal
problems result from bare ET-tank metal of the divot sizes seen on STS-35.
This risk factor was acceptable for STS-37.
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SECTION 6
STS-38 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-38/OV-104 mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter vehicle. Each anomaly is
briefly described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each anomaly in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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ORBITER
1 Water Spray Boiler #2 did not cool Auxiliary Power Unit lube oil 6-3
while under operation of controller "A".
2 Flash Evaporator System water supply accumulator heater system 6-4
biased low.
3 Auxiliary Power Unit #3 X-axis acceleration trace erratic. 6-4
4 Vacuum cleaner short circuit. 6-5
5 Auxiliary Power Unit Exhaust Gas Temperature instrumentation 6-6
interaction with injector tube temperature instrumentation.
6 Right vent doors #1 and #2 purge position failure. 6-7
7 Continuous "tire press" Fault Detection and Annunciation message 6-8
following landing gear safing.
8 Transient smoke detector event indication anomaly. 6-9
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1 Water Spray Boiler (WSB) #2 did not
cool Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) lube oil
while under operation of controller "A".
IFA No. STS-38-01
HR No. ORBI-036 {AR}
Similar problems were encountered with
WSB operation on STS-37 (IFA No.
STS-37-V-02A). WSB #2 did not cool
APU lube oil while under operation of
controller "A", and operation had to be
switched to controller "B" when tube oil
temperature reached 280"F. The most
probable cause of the problem was again
believed to be freezing of the spray bar
caused by wax buildup in the WSB. (See
Section 7, Orbiter 2 for more details.)
WSB #2 controller "A" failed to cool APU lube oil after the end of the pool boiling
period during ascent. The crew switched to controller "B" when the temperature
reached 275°F, and APU #2 was left "on" after APUs #1 and #3 were shut down.
After switching to controller "B", lube oil temperature peaked at 300°F before
cooling was observed after 66 seconds (sec). Controller "A" was selected for reentry
to determine if the temperature control operated properly; controller "A" operated
normally. It was believed that spray bar freeze-up on controller "A" during ascent
caused the problem. Freezing of the spray bar could have been caused by low heat
load on APU #2, or controller "A" was not functioning properly. A similar cooling
problem was experienced on STS-1 through STS-4 and on STS-35/OV-102.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• WSB #2 was replaced.
• Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
(OMRSD) testing on STS-37/OV-104 indicated proper WSB controller
operation.
This anomaly was resolved for STS-37.
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2 Flash Evaporator System (FES) water
supply accumulator heater system biased
low.
IFANo. STS-38-02
HR No. ORBI-276B {C}
No FES problems were reported on
STS-37.
FES heater #1 did not cycle "on" within its prescribed temperature range of
55-75°F. When the temperature reached 49°F, heater string #2 was activated and
cycled in the 48-54°F range with apparently normal duty cycles. Heater string #1
was reactivated and cycled like heater string #2. A temperature sensor debond
problem was the suspected cause of this anomaly. FES heater #1 was removed and
replaced at Kennedy Space Center (KSC).
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• FES heater #1 was replaced and satisfactorily tested.
This anomaly was resolved for STS-37.
APU #3 X-axis acceleration trace erratic.
IFA No. STS-38-03B
No APU acceleration trace anomalies were
reported on STS-37.
During entry, APU #3 X-axis acceleration trace was erratic. The problem was
believed to be a failed accelerometer. There was no previous accelerometer failure
history. Troubleshooting at KSC included connector and accelerometer checkouts
and isolated the anomaly to a broken coax in connector 50P3 pin A. APU #3 was
removed and replaced to comply with life-time cycle limits.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The anomaly was isolated to broken coax.
• APU #3 was removed and replaced during the STS-37/OV-104 flow.
This anomaly was resolved for STS-37.
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4 Vacuum cleaner short circuit.
IFANo. STS-38-04A
HR No. ORBI-301 {C}
No vacuum cleaner problems were reported
on STS-37.
When the crew turned on the vacuum cleaner, Circuit Breaker (CB) #29 on panel
L4 was activated by a current surge. Utility outlet M013Q was not used during the
remainder of the flight; this outlet provides the electrical interface for the food
heater and vacuum cleaner. Outlet testing was completed, and the outlet tested
good. The vacuum cleaner was removed and sent to Johnson Space Center (JSC).
Postflight troubleshooting verified a phase "B" short-to-case on the vacuum cleaner.
Prelaunch vacuum cleaner checkout was modified to include a check for shorts on
all 3 phases. The vacuum cleaner was replaced with a stock unit that passed the
modified checkout procedure.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The anomalous vacuum cleaner was replaced.
• New procedures verified the absence of shorts in the vacuum cleaner
installed on STS-37/OV-104.
Hits anomaly was resolved for STS-37.
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5 APU Exhaust Gas Temperature (EOT)
instrumentation interaction with injector
tube temperature instrumentation.
IFA No. STS-38-05
HRNo. ORBI-106A {AR}
APU #2 injector tube temperature failed
during STS-37 entry. The sensor unit went
erratic and then failed low (IFA No.
STS-37-V-10B).
APU #2 EOT #1 and #2, and APU #2 and #3 injector tube temperatures,
became erratic during launch. The APU injector tube temperatures became erratic
concurrent with EGT sensor failures. The EGT failures affected the common
Designated Signal Conditioner (DSC) power supply isolation card. The injector
temperature instrumentation and EGTs utilize a common DSC. Analysis indicated
that a momentary EGT short-to-ground may have provided a ground loop between
the injector temperature and common power supply, resulting in erratic injector
temperatures. There was no problem with injector tube temperature
measurements; only the EGT measurements were affected. No action was taken by
the crew. Injector temperature measurements remained functional.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The problem was isolated to an EGT short-to-ground, and repairs were
made.
This anomaly was resolved for STS-37.
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6 Right vent doors #1 and #1 purge
position failure.
IFA No. STS-38-06
HRNo. ORBI-178A {AR>
Vent door purge positioning operated
normally on STS-37.
During postlanding vent door purge positioning operations, right vent doors #1 and
#1 drove to the "closed" position instead of the "purge" position. Right vents #1
and #2 are used to purge the forward Reaction Control System (RCS). STS-38
purge could not be performed via right vents #1 and #2. This failure may have
been a limit switch/contact problem. There are 2 Limit switches for door "open"
position, 2 for door "close" position, and 2 for "purge" position. Limit switch failure
is Crit 1R4. The worst-case failure for the vent doors is Crit 1R2. Troubleshooting
isolated the failure to the Power Distribution Unit (PDU). The PDU was replaced,
and testing indicated satisfactory performance.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• The anomalous PDU was replaced and tested satisfactory.
This anomaly was resolved for STS-37.
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7 Continuous "tire press" Fault Detection Continuous "tire press" messages were observed following landing gear safing
and Annunciation (FDA) message procedures. During this procedure, one set of messages is expected after removal
following landing gear safing. of the landing gear "arm" flag; however, continuous messages were noted. Initial
visual inspection of the Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS) showed no
IFA No. STS-38-08 abnormalities. Troubleshooting found no other problems. This anomaly was closed
as unexplained.
HR No. ORBI-018 {AR}
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
No anomalous FDA tire pressure messages
were experienced on STS-37. • This was a first-time occurrence; there were no indications of a generic
problem.
This anomaly was resolved for STS-37.
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8 Transient smoke detector event indication
anomaly.
IFA No. STS-38-09
HR No. ORBI-300 {C}
No problems were experienced with the
avionics bay smoke detectors on STS-37.
Smoke detector "3A" in avionics bay "3A" did not have enough voltage to ring the
alarm, but the event indicators (lights) lit. There were several previous instances of
smoke detector failures where no apparent cause could be found. This occurrence
was similar to the problem experienced on STS-41.
On STS-32, avionics bay "3A" smoke detector "3A" experienced repeated transient
alarms and associated lights. A decision was made to pull the sensor circuit breaker
to avoid nuisance alarms during sleep, reentry, and landing periods. The sensor was
removed and replaced. The defective unit was sent to the vendor for failure
analysis, but the unit was damaged before the vendor could examine it.
STS-38 smoke detector "3A" was removed, and failure analysis will be performed in
conjunction with failure analysis of the STS-32 smoke detector anomaly.
Rationale for STS-37 flight was:
• Occurrences of this anomaly to date indicated a problem with the detector.
• In no case was smoke found in the avionics bay.
This anomaly was resolved for STS-37.
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SECTION 7
STS-37 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-37/OV-104 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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1 Reaction Control System primary thruster R1U failed off during 7-3
External Tank separation maneuver.
2 Water Spray Boiler #2 did not cool Auxiliary Power Unit lube oil 7-3
while under operation of controller "A".
3 Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Oxygen manifold valve #2 7-4
failed to close when commanded.
4 Indications of low Chamber Pressure on primary thrusters LIU and 7-5
L1L during interconnect operations.
5 Backup Flight System navigation initialization anomaly. 7-5
6 Water Spray Boiler #3 overcool during entry. 7-7
Left-hand forward skirt skin panel buckling. 7-8
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1 Reaction Control System (RCS) primary
thruster R1U failed off during External
Tank (ET) separation maneuver.
IFANo. STS-37-V-01
HR No. ORBI-056 {AR}
RCS primary thruster R1U failed off during the STS-37 ET separation maneuver.
Recorded pressure data indicated that the thruster Chamber Pressure (Pc) was
10 pounds per square inch absolute (psia); nominal Pc is 150 psia at thruster firing.
Thruster injector temperatures indicated some oxidizer and fuel flow in R1U when
firing was attempted. R1U was deselected by Redundancy Management (RM) and
remained off for the remainder of the mission.
Several similar thruster anomalies of this type were experienced on previous
missions. Pressure traces from the STS-37 R1U failure were similar to those seen
on R3D and R4R on STS-36. Iron nitrate contamination of the oxidizer valve
poppet was determined to be the cause of both STS-36 thruster failures. Iron
nitrate contamination forms when the oxidizer, Nitrogen Tetroxide (N2O4), is
allowed to contact moisture in ambient air. This contamination prevented the
oxidizer valves from opening in the time allotted to achieve proper Pc. It is believed
that iron nitrate contamination may also have caused R1U to fail. R1U was
removed when OV-104 returned to Kennedy Space Center (KSC); the unit was sent
to the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) for further analysis.
Water Spray Boiler (WSB) #2 did not
cool Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) lube oil
while under operation of controller "A".
IFANo. STS-37-V-02A
HR No. ORBI-036 {AR}
WSB #2 failed to cool APU #2 lube oil after the end of the pool boiling period
during ascent. WSB #2 was under the operation of controller "A". The crew was
directed to switch to controller "B" when lube oil temperature reached
280° Fahrenheit (F); nominal cooling begins at 250 °F. Lube oil temperature had
begun to drop just prior to the crew action. The same anomaly occurred during
STS-38, the previous flight of OV-104. Both controller "A" and WSB #2 were
removed and replaced after STS-38.
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2 (Continued) WSB #2 did not cool APU lube oil while
under operation of controller "A".
The most probable cause of this problem was freezing of the spray bar caused by
wax buildup in the WSB. Wax, in the form of pentaerythritol, is formed when the
APU hydrazine fuel is allowed to mix with lube oil. Pentaerythritol will begin to
melt when lube oil temperature exceeds 200 °F. There were no preflight indications
of wax buildup in the APU #2 lube oil or in WSB #2. Research of this WSB
cooling problem indicated an emerging trend when WSBs are paired with APU
Serial Number (S/N) 208. Further investigation into this and other APU/WSB
combinations is in work. To date, there have been no similar WSB cooling
problems on OV-103. Nor has there been any evidence of high APU lube oil
pressures on OV-103, a good indication that wax has not formed in the lube oil.
Power Reactant Supply and Distribution
(PRSD) Oxygen (O2) manifold valve #2
failed to close when commanded.
IFANo. STS-37-V-03
HR No. ORBI-094 {AR}
PRSD O2 manifold valve #2 failed to close when commanded the first two tunes on
orbit. The valve, S/N 28, finally closed on the third command and was left dosed
for the remainder of the STS-37 mission. O2 manifold valve #2 is 1 of 2 redundant
valves used to isolate the manifold or PRSD supply tank from a system leak.
Failure of both manifold valves to close would result in depletion of fuel cell O2
reactants and potential loss of the 3 fuel cell power plants.
O2 manifold valve #2, S/N 28, previously failed to dose when first commanded on
OV-104 during STS-34. Postflight troubleshooting found no problems with the
valve operation, and the anomaly was closed as unexplained. S/N 28 worked
properly on the 2 OV-104 flights between STS-34 and STS-37: STS-36 and STS-38.
Troubleshooting at Dryden found no problem. S/N 28 was removed and replaced
when OV-104 returned to KSC.
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4 Indications of low Pc on primary thrusters
LIU and L1L during interconnect
operations.
IFANo. STS-37-V-08
HR No. ORBI-056 {C}
During STS-38/OV-104, low Pc was experienced on 4 primary thrusters: R1U, R3D,
RF3L, and R4U. Postflight troubleshooting did not reveal any thruster leaks or
other anomalies that might lead to low thruster Pc.
Recent analysis determined that STS-38 thrusters R1U, R3D, RF3L, and R4U all
indicated low Pc during interconnect operations; the right pod thruster manifold was
interconnected to the left Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) propellant tanks.
When RP03 propellant source was switched from the right OMS propellant tanks
back to the straight feed configuration, thruster Pc in R1U, R3D, RF3L, and R4U
returned to nominal. This finding led to the decision to perform thruster firings on
STS-37/OV-104 in the interconnect configuration. When this was performed,
thrusters LIU and L1L showed degraded P,., approximately 130 psia instead of
150 psia nominal. Pc in LIU and L1L returned to nominal after reconfiguration to
straight feed. It is believed that there may be contamination in the oxidizer
interconnect line. Troubleshooting will be performed at KSC.
Backup Flight System (BFS) navigation
initialization anomaly.
IFANo. STS-37-V-09
HR No. ORBI-066 {AR}
Postlaunch data analysis of the BFS telemetry indicated that, from the prelaunch
BFS OPS-1 transition until the T-8 second (sec) BFS reinitialization, the
Z-component (altitude) of the BFS state vector was increasing at a rate of
approximately 1 foot per second (ft/sec) to approximately 7700 feet (ft). The BFS
navigation errors were cleared at the T-8 sec point in the launch countdown when
the BFS was reinitialized to the pad B position. Ascent telemetry review indicated
that both the BFS and the Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) performed
nominally.
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5 (Continued) BFS navigation initialization anomaly. Data review found that the Z-component was approximately 250 ft at the OPS-1
transition plus 3-minute (min) point; previous flight data indicated the Z-component
to be 6 to 30 ft during the same time in the launch countdown. During previous
launch countdowns, Z-component errors of 1500 to 3000 ft were observed up to the
T-8 sec period. Recent pre-STS-37 tests, conducted in the Shuttle Avionics
Integration Laboratory (SAIL) with the new General Purpose Computers (GPCs),
demonstrated errors of 4000 to 4500 ft. Errors are believed to be caused by gravity
feedback, and this eventually leads to error growth in the Z-component.
The investigation included a code audit of the BFS and PASS. This audit
determined that the problem was only in the first initialization of the navigation
function in the BFS. The PASS navigation function did not have the same
problems. Testing of the BFS at the SAIL repeated the STS-37 prelaunch anomaly
on each attempt and demonstrated that the problem was not from the Inertial
Measurement Unit (IMU) input. It is believed that this anomaly was caused by the
increased processing time of the new GPCs, combined with the way the BFS
sequences initialization of the navigation function. Discrepancy Report (DR)
106197 was generated to identify this problem for resolution.
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6 WSB #3 overcool during entry.
IFANo. STS-37-V-12
HR No. ORBI-036 {AR}
System #3 post-Main Engine Cutoff (MECO) APU/WSB lube oil temperature ran
cooler than the other 2 systems; lube oil return temperature was 231 "F minimum.
System #3 saw a second overcool during entry, lube oil return temperature was
211 °F minimum.
System #3 APU/WSB showed evidence of contamination. High gearbox pressure
was observed during the pad APU confidence run. The filter and oil were changed
out prior to flight.
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1 Left-Hand (LH) forward skirt skin panel During postflight inspection, the aft end of the LH forward skirt skin panel was
buckling. found to have buckled on either side of the system tunnel. This forward skirt,
S/N 22, had flown on STS-27R (BIO-030) and STS-33R (BIO-034). The STS-27R
IFA No. STS-37-B-01 and STS-33 postflight inspection reports indicated no abnormal conditions of the
LH forward skirt. STS-37 postflight orbiter data, reviewed through prelaunch,
launch and separation, showed nominal flight conditions. Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC) concluded that buckling was most likely caused by the slapdown
load during water impact. The slapdown load on this booster was reported to be
the highest ever recorded (92 g versus 12-40 g history). The dynamics of the Solid
Rocket Booster (SRB) were likely affected by wave height, wave period, wave
length, etc., of the sea-state 5 condition.
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SECTION 8
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. It is intended as a supplement to
provide more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AGO Acceptance Checkout
ADI Attitude Direction Indicator
AFB Air Force Base
AMOS Air Force Maui Optical Station
APM Ascent Particle Monitor
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
AR Accepted Risk
ATE Automatic Test Equipment
BATSE Burst and Transient Source Experiment
BFS Backup Flight System
BIMDA Bioserve ITA Materials Dispersion Apparatus
BITE Built-in Test Equipment
C Controlled
CA California
CAR Corrective Action Report
CAV Captive Air Vent
CB Circuit Breaker
CCP Carbon Cloth Phenolic
CETA Crew and Equipment Transaction Aid
CIL Critical Item List
CLIP Crew Loads Instruments Pallet Experiment
CMOS Complementary Metal Oxide Silicon
CO AS Crew Optical Alignment Sight
COMPTEL Imaging Compton Telescope
CR Change Request
Crit Criticality
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
CTI Charlton Technologies, Inc.
CWC Contingency Water Container
CWS Caution and Warning System
DAR Deviation Approval Request
DDU Display Driver Unit
DEU Data Entry Unit
DPS Data Processing System
DR Discrepancy Report
DSC Designated Signal Conditioner
DSO Detailed Supplementary Objective
DTO Development Test Objective
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EAFB Edwards Air Force Base
EDFE Extravehicular Activity Developmental Flight Experiment
EDT Eastern Daylight Time
EGRET Energetic Gamma Ray Experiment Telescope
EGT Exhaust Gas Temperature
EST Eastern Standard Time
ET External Tank
ETE Extravehicular Activity Translation Evaluation
EVA Extravehicular Activity
F Fahrenheit
FASCOS Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
FCV Flow Control Valve
FD Flight Day
FDA Fault Detection and Annunciation
FES Flash Evaporator System
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FMEA/CIL Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
FOS Factor of Safety
FR Flight Rule
FRI Flow Recirculation Inhibitor
FRR Flight Readiness Review
ft Feet
ft-lb Foot-Pounds
ft/sec Foot Per Second
GGVM Gas Generator Valve Module
GH2 Gaseous Hydrogen
GN&C Guidance, Navigation and Control
GN2 Gaseous Nitrogen
GO2 Gaseous Oxygen
GOX Gaseous Oxygen
GPC General Purpose Computer
GRO Gamma Ray Observatory
GSE Ground Support Equipment
H2 Hydrogen
HAC Heading Alignment Cone
HCF High-Cycle Fatigue
HDS Hydrogen Dispersal System
HGDS Hazardous Gas Detection System
HPFTP High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
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HPM High Performance Motor
HPOTP High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
HR Hazard Report
hr Hours
HST Hubble Space Telescope
I/O Input/Output
EBR Inner Boot Ring
EEA Integrated Electronics Assembly
IFA Inflight Anomaly
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit
in-lb Inch-Pounds
INTO Integration
IPL Initial Program Load
JSC Johnson Space Center
K Kilobytes
KSC Kennedy Space Center
ksi Thousand Pounds Per Square Inch
L-2 Launch Minus 2 Day
Ib Pounds
LCC Launch Commit Criteria
LCF Low-Cycle Fatigue
LH Left-Hand
LH2 Liquid Hydrogen
LO2 Liquid Oxygen
LOX Liquid Oxygen
LPFTP Low-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
LPOTP Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
LSFR Launch Site Row Review
M&P Materials and Processing
MCC Main Combustion Chamber
MDM Multiplexer-Demultiplexer
ME Main Engine
MEC Master Event Controller
MECO Main Engine Cutoff
MeV Million Electron Volts
mg/ft2 Milligrams Per Square Foot
min Minutes
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MLG Main Landing Gear
MLP Mobile Launch Platform
MMC Martin Marietta Corporation
MMU Mass Memory Unit
MPS Main Propulsion System
MPU Magnetic Pickup Unit
MSE Mission Safety Evaluation
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
N2 Nitrogen
N2O4 Nitrogen Tetroxide
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NDE Nondestructive Evaluation
NLG Nose Landing Gear
NSRS NASA Safety Reporting System
O2 Oxygen
OMI Operation and Maintenance Instruction
OMRSD Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
OMS Orbital Maneuvering System
OOR On-Orbit Refueling
OPF Orbiter Processing Facility
OPS Operational Sequence
OSMQ Office of Safety and Mission Quality
OSSE Oriented Scintillation Spectrometer Experiment
OV Orbiter Vehicle
P/N Part Number
PAR Prelaunch Assessment Review
PASS Primary Avionics Software System
Pc Chamber Pressure
PCG Protein Crystal Growth
PDU Power Distribution Unit
PLED Payload Bay Door
ppm Parts Per Million
PRCB Program Requirements Control Board
PRSD Power Reactant Supply and Distribution
psi Pounds Per Square Inch
psia Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
psid Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
psig Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
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RCS Reaction Control System
RGA Rate Gyro Assembly
RH Right-Hand
RI Rockwell International
RM Redundancy Management
RME Radiation Monitoring Equipment
RMS Remote Manipulator System
rpm Revolutions Per Minute
RSRM Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
RTLS Return to Launch Site
RTV Room Temperature Vulcanizing
S/N Serial Number
SAIL Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
SAREX Shuttle Amateur Radio Equipment
seem Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Minute
sees Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Second
scfm Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute
sec Seconds
SEM Scanning Electron Microscope
SHARE Space Station Heat Pipe Advanced Radiator Element
SM Systems Management
SMS Shuttle Missile Simulator
SODB Shuttle Operational Data Book
SOV Shutoff Valve
Spec Specification
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SRM Solid Rocket Motor
SSC Stennis Space Center
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
SSRP System Safety Review Panel
STA Shuttle Training Aircraft
TAL Transatlantic Abort Landing
TC Thiokol Corporation
TEM Test and Evaluation Motor
TPMS Tire Pressure Monitoring System
TPS Thermal Protection System
TVC Thrust Vector Control
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U/N Unit Number
USBI United Space Boosters, Inc.
WSB Water Spray Boiler
WSTF White Sands Test Facility
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